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The subprime mortgage crisis and the ongoing European debt crisis have led macroe-
conomists to rethink macroeconomics (Caballero, 2010; Stiglitz, 2011). Standard macroe-
conomic models and their empirical counterparts put aside financial crises. Typical as-
sumptions of those models, such as rational expectations, representative agents, complete
financial market, limit their ability to analyze causes and consequences of financial crises.
Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis focus on the interaction between macroeconomic variables
and the financial sector. They relax assumptions of the standard macroeconomic models
in different directions. Chapter 2 relax the rational expectations assumption. Chapter 3
relax the assumption of representative agents. Both chapters relax the complete financial
market assumption.
Chapter 2 studies the determinants of the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads
of five Euro-area countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). We focus on the
period in which the global financial crisis deepens and contingent government debt neces-
sary to bailout the financial sector may have contributed to the run-up to sovereign debt
crises in those countries. The sovereign CDS contract is a quasi-insurance instrument
for the sovereign credit risk. In the previous literature, it is believed that macroeco-
nomic fundamentals linked to a country’s sovereign credit risk should affect the price of
this quasi-insurance instrument, that is, the sovereign CDS spread. We find that there
are regime switches in the process of sovereign CDS spread changes. Under one regime,
changes in financial market-based indicators of macroeconomic fundamentals have signif-
icant explanatory power to changes in sovereign CDS spreads. Under the other regime,
changes in financial market-based indicators of macroeconomic fundamentals have no
explanatory power to changes in sovereign CDS spreads. Those regime switches are
difficult to explain under the rational expectations assumption. By contrast, they are
consistent with a theory of “animal spirits” in which agents are cognitively limited.
The concept “animal spirits” dates back to Keynes (1936). He argues that if market
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uncertainty is high, an investor’s decision is “the result of animal spirits-a spontaneous
urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of
quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities”. Although animal spirits
play an important role in the economic theory of Keynes (1936), it is not at the core
of modern macroeconomics.1 On the occasions when the term “animal spirits” is used
in macroeconomic models, it is interpreted as sunspot shocks to the expectations of
rational investors who are not cognitively limited.2 Chapter 2 shows that the rational
expectations interpretation of animal spirits cannot explain what we find in the European
sovereign CDS market. However, an alternative interpretation of animal spirits provides
a good explanation for the sovereign CDS spread dynamics we observe. More specifi-
cally, animal spirits is interpreted as the belief of cognitively limited agents. If market
uncertainty is low, cognitive biases are small and market-based indicators of macroeco-
nomic fundamentals contain useful information for investors. Therefore, those indicators
affect sovereign CDS pricing. If market uncertainty is high, cognitive biases are large and
market-based indicators of macroeconomic fundamentals become useless for investors to
infer the sovereign credit risk. Therefore, those indicators no longer affect the sovereign
CDS spread.
Those findings of chapter 2 has important policy implications. Hart and Zingales
(2011) suggest using CDS spreads on the long-term debt of large financial institutions to
regulate them. The purpose is to contain systemic risk caused by the failure of those too-
big-to-fail financial institutions. The idea is that a high CDS spread signals a high default
risk of debt issued by the institution. In this case, the financial institution should be
required to issue more equity or the regulator should intervene. There may be a tendency
to extend this idea to public debt management. That is, one may suggest using sovereign
CDS spread to monitor the sovereign credit risk and guide actions to prevent or resolve a
sovereign debt crisis. However, a precondition of such a policy proposal is that sovereign
CDS spreads should be reliable indicators of the sovereign credit risk. We find that
during the run-up to a sovereign debt crisis, the information content of sovereign CDS
spreads can be highly distorted by investors’ animal spirits. Therefore, it is not advisable
to implement public debt management policies based on sovereign CDS spreads.
1See Akerlof and Shiller (2009) for a brief review of the history of the interaction between the animal
spirits concept and economic theories.
2See Farmer (2008) for a survey of ration expectations models of animal spirits.
2
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Chapter 3 of the thesis studies implications of a central bank’s monetary policy rules
on long-run financial stability. The pioneering work of Kydland and Prescott (1977)
and Barro and Gordon (1983) shows that discretionary monetary policy can lead to
excessively high inflation rate. One response to this theoretical result is to shift from
discretionary monetary policy to monetary policy rules. The best-known monetary policy
rule is the Taylor (1993) rule. Taylor (1993) argues that the monetary policy of the
United States Federal Reserve under Greespan’s chairmanship can be well described by
a reaction function of the nominal federal funds rate to inflation and the output gap, the
deviation of the logarithm of real gross domestic product from its trend. This reaction
function described by Taylor is called the Taylor rule. According to the Taylor rule,
other things being equal, the nominal federal funds rate increases by 1.5 percent if the
annual inflation rate increases by 1 percent. It increases by 0.5 percent if the output gap
increases by 1 percent, other things being equal.
Later theoretical developments link the coefficients of the inflation rate and the output
gap in the central bank’s reaction function to the stability of the economy. The famous
Taylor principle says that if the central bank’s policy interest rate adjusts more than
one-for-one with inflation, the economy will be stabilized.3 Bernanke and Gertler (2000)
and Bernanke and Gertler (2001) further argue that a central bank’s interest rate rule
which requires the policy interest rate to react aggressively on inflation is enough to
stabilize the asset market as well. This argument is based on financial accelerator models
(Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Bernanke et al., 1999). In such models, decline in asset
prices increases the external finance premium faced by firms. More expensive external
borrowing reduces investment and aggregate demand. The decline in aggregate demand
in turn reduces inflation. Therefore, asset prices and the general price level always go
in the same direction. Asset prices are stabilized if the general price level is stabilized.
When both asset prices and the general price level are stabilized, real economy is also
stabilized.
An important implication of financial accelerator models is that the central bank is
able to handle both the stability of the real economy and financial stability at the same
time with only one instrument, the nominal interest rate. In Chapter 3 of this thesis, this
3The validity of this statement is a major research topic in macroeconomics. See Clarida et al. (2000),
Woodford (2003), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Davig and Leeper (2007), Sims and Zha (2006), Farmer
et al. (2009), Farmer et al. (2010).
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ideal result disappears. In this chapter, there are two different types of investors who
have to borrow from financial intermediaries to make their investment. One type invests
in the production sector while the other engages in a gambling activity. The central
bank’s monetary policy affects the loan portfolio faced by financial intermediaries by
affecting expected cash flows of both types of borrowers. By lowing the interest rate,
the central bank makes debt repayment easier for investors in both production and
gambling activities. This encourages entry of both types of investors. More investment
can boost the economy in the short run. However, more investors entering the real
sector during the boom makes competition tougher and deters future entry. By contrast,
because the outcome of the gamble relies on luck rather than previous entry, future
entry in the gambling market remains relatively stable. Therefore, in the long run the
proportion of gamblers in the pool of loan applicants increases, threatening financial
stability. An important policy implication of the model in Chapter 3 is that it is difficult
to achieve both the stability of the real economy and financial stability with only one
policy instrument, the nominal interest rate. Central banks need to be equipped more
than one tools. This justifies the ongoing efforts to strengthen the macro-prudential
supervision role of central banks (Orphanides, 2011). Future research should be carried
out to find the best policy mix to achieve both the traditional policy goal of price stability
and the policy goal of macro-prudential supervision.
While Chapter 3 focuses on monetary policy transmission in a closed economy con-
text, Chapter 4 asks the question whether openness has affected monetary policy trans-
mission. More specifically, we ask whether openness has affected the slope of the Phillips
curve. Phillips (1958) finds a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and
the growth rate of nominal wage in Britain since 1861. This negative relationship is
translated into a tradeoff between inflation and unemployment faced by monetary policy
makers. The natural rate hypothesis which appears later says that there is a natural rate
of unemployment which is determined by the microeconomic structure. There is a short-
run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. However, the actual unemployment
rate cannot deviate from the natural rate in the long run. The output level corresponds
to the natural rate of unemployment is called potential output. When the unemployment
rate is lower than the natural rate, the output level is higher than the potential output.
Therefore, the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment in the Phillips curve is usu-
4
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ally expressed as a tradeoff between inflation and the output gap. Modern theoretical
models of the Phillips curve are based on microeconomic foundations and address the role
of rational expectations.4 An important implication from those model is that inflation
expectations have to be anchored to fight inflation.
In the past few years, there is a debate on whether globalization has contributed to
a lower long-run inflation rate. A key channel through which globalization may affect
the long-run inflation rate identified by the literature is that it affects the slope of the
Phillips curve. Romer (1993), Lane (1997) and Rogoff (2003) argue that more trade
openness makes the Phillips curve steeper. In other words, increase in the inflation rate
for a given level of output expansion relative to the potential output is larger in a more
open economy. Central banks prefer a lower inflation rate and want to keep the output
at its potential level. Under the assumption that central banks attach fixed weights to
inflation and the output gap in their objective functions, a steeper Phillips curve will
make it less attractive for a central bank to fight recession by inflationary policies. A
lower inflation bias of the central bank reduces the long-run inflation rate. Models with
a benevolent central bank which maximizes the welfare of a representative household can
give completely different results. Razin and Loungani (2005) argue that globalization de-
links domestic consumption from domestic production. As a result, distortions associated
with fluctuations in domestic output gap are reduced. At the same time, domestic
production will have less impact on the Consumer Price Index. Therefore, globalization
both flattens the Phillips curve and reduces the relative weight of the output gap in
central banks’ objective functions. Reduction in the long-run inflation rate is due to the
reduction in the relative weight of the output gap in central banks’ objective functions.
A critique to those models is that the predicted impact of trade openness on the slope
of the Phillips curve is not observed in the OECD countries. Chapter 4 of this thesis
shows that empirical evidence supporting this critique is based on a wrong parameter
homogeneity assumption. More specifically, empirical studies which find trade openness
has no effect on the slope of the Phillips curve in the OECD assume that openness has
the same effect on the slope of the Phillips curve across countries. Chapter 4 presents
theory and evidence that this assumption is wrong. When cross-country heterogeneity
is properly modeled, openness is found to have significant effects on the slope of the
4See Woodford (2003) for a survey.
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Phillips curve in several major OECD countries. This result suggests that it is too
early to conclude that globalization has not contributed to the reduction in the long-run
inflation rate in the OECD. Woodford (2007) argues that globalization has no impact
on monetary control. This claim is too strong. If the tradeoff between inflation and the
output gap faced by central banks is changed by globalization, their policy will adjust
accordingly. At this stage, it is still not clear what is the optimal monetary policy or
policy mix in a global context. A lot more research has to be carried out before giving
serious policy suggestions. An interesting direction is to study what are the implications
of globalization on the interactions between monetary policy and financial stability.
To summarize, this thesis focuses on three interlinked topics. Chapter 2 studies the
determinants of sovereign CDS spreads in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain
during the recent global financial crisis and European debt crisis. The rational ex-
pectations assumption of the standard macroeconomic model is relaxed to explain the
findings. Chapter 3 introduces a model on the interactions between monetary policy
rules and long-run financial stability. In this chapter, we relax the representative agents
assumption of the standard macroeconomic model. Chapter 4 reports that globalization
has significantly affected the output gap-inflation tradeoff faced by central banks. This
result challenges the statement that globalization has no impact on monetary control.








During the European sovereign debt crisis, sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads
of the Euro countries drew a lot of public attention. The reason is that a country’s
CDS spread is usually taken as an indicator of that country’s sovereign credit risk.6 In
this chapter, we test the reliability of the sovereign CDS spread as an indicator of the
sovereign credit risk. More specifically, we test whether changes in variables related to
the sovereign credit risk are significant determinants for changes in the sovereign CDS
spreads of five Euro-area countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) in the
post-Lehman-Brothers period (from September 15, 2008 to December 19, 2011).
There are a number of empirical studies on the determinants of sovereign CDS spreads
in developed countries. Longstaff et al. (2011) find that global financial market condi-
tions significantly affect sovereign CDS spreads of 26 countries, including both developing
and developed countries such as Japan and Korea. Dieckmann and Plank (2011) extend
their analysis to Western European countries and find that global financial factors also
play significant roles there. Moreover, they report that changes in the performance of
the financial industry affect changes in the CDS spreads of Western European sovereigns.
This finding is consistent with a private-to-public risk transfer hypothesis: prospective
government debt necessary to help the distressed financial industry may increase a coun-
try’s sovereign credit risk. Fontana and Scheicher (2010) focus on Euro area countries
5This chapter is coauthored with Hans Blommestein and Sylvester Eijffinger.
6In this chapter, we define the sovereign credit risk by the default probability of the sovereign bonds
and the associated recovery rate after default.
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and also find changes in sovereign CDS spreads are related to global factors. They find
that measures of investors’ changing risk appetite play a prominent role in the sovereign
CDS pricing.
All those previous empirical studies share two features. First, the empirical models
are linear. More specifically, there is no regime switching in the models. Second, the
covariates are assumed to be exogenous. In this chapter, we show that those two features
can bias the statistical inference.
Regime switching can arise from three different theories. Two of those theories are
related to different concepts of “animal spirits”. In the rational expectations framework,
the animal spirits (henceforth we shall call this concept of animal spirits “animal spirits
1”) are interpreted as sunspot shocks7 to investors’ expectations (Farmer, 2008). Those
sunspot shocks cause multiple equilibria. The economy will be in a good equilibrium
if people believe so while the economy will be in a bad equilibrium if people believe it
to be bad. Such sunspot-driven multiple equilibria have been used to explain different
economic phenomena. They are used to explain excessive volatility in macroeconomic
variables such as output and inflation (Clarida et al., 2000; Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004;
Davig and Leeper, 2007; Farmer et al., 2010). Diamond and Dybvig (1983) use them
to explain bank runs. In international finance, they are used to explain self-fulfilling
currency crises (Burnside et al., 2008; Jeanne, 2000). Jeanne and Masson (2000) propose
an empirical test for the existence of rational sunspot equilibria in the currency crises
context. They prove that the effects of the sunspot shocks are absorbed by discrete jumps
in the intercept of a regression of the currency devaluation probability on fundamental
variables. Therefore, a test for Markov regime switches in the intercept can be taken as
a test for the existence of sunspot equilibria. We argue in Section 4.2 that this test can
be applied to the sovereign CDS market under the rational expectations assumption.
While the theory of animal spirits 1 predicts regime switches in the intercept of the
regression model, an alternative theoretical model under the rational expectations as-
sumption predicts regime switches in the slopes of the regression model. Assuming that
investors are rational and there is no sunspot equilibrium, the slopes change if govern-
ments change their preferences over different policy objectives. For example, when the




financial crisis deepens, the weight attached to financial stability may become larger rel-
ative to economic growth in governments’ objective functions. Anticipating this, rational
investors will change their pricing behavior accordingly. Section 4.2 shows that this can
lead to regime-dependent slope changes in the CDS spread determination equation.
Under the rational expectations assumption, investors are cognitively unlimited.
Therefore, changes in market-based indicators of fundamentals always provide reliable
information on the development of fundamental variables. Moreover, the information
will be correctly incorporated into sovereign CDS spreads. Those results no longer hold
if investors are not cognitively limited. When uncertainties overwhelm the market and
there are time constraints for decision-making, the investors rely more on beliefs that are
not necessarily based on rational calculations. We call those movements in beliefs of the
cognitively limited investors “animal spirits 2” since they are different from the sunspot
shocks (“animal spirits 1”) in the rational expectations framework. The “animal spirits
2” concept is close to the definition of animal spirits in two recent theoretical papers by
De Grauwe (2011a, 2012). In those two papers, agents are not fully rational, that is,
they are cognitively limited, and use heuristics rather than rational calculations to make
decisions. Agents’ sentiments are self-fulfilling because they switch from an optimistic
forecast rule to a pessimistic forecast rule if more other agents adopt the pessimistic rule.
The widespread pessimistic psychology dampens aggregate demand and eventually leads
to a bad outcome. De Grauwe (2011a, 2012) formalizes the concept of “confidence multi-
plier”of Akerlof and Shiller (2009). According to Akerlof and Shiller (2009), confidence is
the belief of cognitively limited agents rather than a sunspot shock to the expectations of
perfectly rational agents. De Grauwe (2011a, 2012) does not consider the possibility that
agents can change their focus variables in their decision rules if market condition changes.
Our definition of “animal spirits 2” allows this possibility.8 Particularly, when market
conditions become very uncertain, agents may drop decision rules based on observable
fundamental variables. It is important to point out that ignoring the fundamentals does
not mean that investors are irrational. It may be a boundedly9 rational choice by the
cognitively limited and imperfectly informed investors. It is because movements in the
8Branch and Evans (2007) introduce a model in which agents can change their focus variable in their
decision rules. Those agents are taken as econometricians. As pointed out by De Grauwe (2011a), such
agents may have better cognitive skills than agents in the real world.
9We use the word“bounded”to suggest that agents are cognitively limited whereas perfect rationality
means that agents are cognitively unlimited.
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observable fundamental variables are driven by market participants whose cognitive abil-
ities are also limited. The information content of those fundamentals is more seriously
distorted by the cognitive biases in a more uncertain market. Therefore, observable fun-
damental variables which are useful when market uncertainty is low can become useless
if market uncertainty becomes very high. The theory of animal spirits 2 is consistent
with a two-state regime switching model. Under the regime with low market uncertainty,
market-based indicators of fundamental variables have significant explanatory power for
changes in sovereign CDS spreads. Under the regime with high market uncertainty, all
market-based indicators of fundamentals are insignificant.
Above theoretical possibilities for regime switching motivate a form test for regime
switching in regression models. Using the quasi-likelihood ratio test developed by Cho
and White (2007), we show that the model linearity assumption in previous studies are
not valid.
Previous empirical studies on the determination of the sovereign CDS spreads as-
sume that the covariates are exogenous. This assumption rules out the possibility that
dynamics in the sovereign CDS spreads may affect fundamental variables. Ruling out
such a possibility can be a source of bias. Particularly, it is possible that changes in
the CDS spreads will feedback to governments’ borrowing costs and affect domestic eco-
nomic fundamentals.10 Using a two-step estimation technique developed by Kim (2009),
we estimate our regime switching model with instrumental variables and formally test
for endogeneity based on the estimation results. Our test suggests that the domestic
fundamentals are indeed endogenous in four sample countries (Ireland, Italy, Portugal
and Spain). Therefore, compared to the previous studies using ordinary least squares
(OLS), our results are more reliable; not only because we model the omitted nonlineari-
ties caused by regime switches but also because we correct for reverse causality.
We find that there is no regime switch in the intercept of the regression equations.
This indicates a failure of the joint hypothesis of rational expectations and sunspot
equilibria. Therefore, the theory of animal spirits 1 is rejected. There are regime switches
in the slopes of the regression equations. A possible explanation is that there is a unique
rational expectations equilibrium in which the policy focus of the government changes.




the sovereign CDS spreads are white noise. That is, they are completely disconnected
from all the fundamental variables. The results are better explained by the theory of
animal spirits 2. Observable indicators of fundamentals have little value to investors in
the sovereign CDS market due to distortions caused by cognitive biases when market
uncertainty is high. They are more valuable and used by investors to price the sovereign
CDS contracts when market uncertainty is low.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 elaborates on three em-
pirical hypotheses. Section 2.3 introduces the explanatory variables and describes the
data. Section 2.4 provides estimates of OLS regression models for the determination of
sovereign CDS spreads and tests for regime switching in the models. Section 2.5 shows
estimated regime switching models with instrumental variables and tests for endogeneity.
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2. Empirical hypotheses
In the section, we elaborate on three alternative empirical hypothesis for the Euro-area
sovereign CDS market.
Hypothesis 1 (animal spirits 1): agents are fully rational and there exist multiple
sunspot equilibria.
According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), a country’s default decision is the result of
a cost-benefit analysis. Many countries default on their debts long before they run out
of financial resources. Under the rational expectations assumption, Jeanne and Masson
(2000) model a country’s probability of currency devaluation as a result of its cost-
benefit analysis. Due to the similarity, we can apply that model to our sovereign CDS
context. More specifically, let us assume that the net benefit function of the government
is B(ft, dt), where ft is an index of economic fundamentals, dt ≡
∫ 1
0
dt(i)di is the average
estimate of the probability of default formed by a continuum of investors i ∈ [0, 1].11
The net benefit function is increasing in ft, reflecting the idea that the better the funda-
mentals are, the higher will be the chance that the government will honor its debt. It is
11The two-step estimation approach of Kim (2009) is designed for time series not for panel data
analysis. Therefore, we estimate empirical models separately for each country. That is why we only
have the time subscript for variables.
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decreasing in dt, suggesting that it is more costly to honor the debt if the investors have
higher estimates for the default probability. More specifically, a higher expected default
probability increases the interest rate for sovereign borrowing and induces the investors
to divert their investment to safer assets, making rollover more difficult (De Grauwe,
2011b).
Investor i expects that the government will default if the net benefit of honoring
its debt becomes negative. Therefore, dt(i) = Prob[B(ft+1, dt+1) < 0|ft], where Prob
denotes probability. Following Jeanne and Masson (2000), we assume that the in-
vestors share common knowledge so that we can drop index i in the formula. Under
some additional technical assumptions12, there is a critical value of the fundamental in-
dex below which the government will default, given the market estimate of the default
probability. Therefore, we can write the average estimate of the default probability as
dt = Prob[ft+1 < f
∗e|ft] ≡ F (ft, f ∗e), where f ∗ is the critical value defined by the equa-
tion B(f ∗, dt) = 0, the superscript e denotes expectation. Note that f
∗ is an implicit
function of dt and dt is a function of f
∗e , so f ∗ is a function of f ∗e, which we denote
by g(f ∗e). Under the rational expectations assumption, f ∗ = f ∗e, so f ∗ = g(f ∗). That
is, f ∗ is a fixed point of the function g. Jeanne and Masson (2000) show that there
can be more than one fixed point of g. Their proposition 1 further establishes that if
there is more than one fixed point of g, there will be multiple sunspot equilibria. More
specifically, there will be n states under which the threshold fundamental index value
(denoted by f ∗s , where s is the state index) differs. The probability of default depends
not only on the fundamental variables, but also on the transition probabilities from the
current to the future states:
dt = Σ
n
s=1q(st, s)F (ft, f
∗
s ), (2.1)
where q(st, s) is the transition probability from the current state to state s in the next
period, F (ft, f
∗
s ) ≡ Prob[ft+1 < f ∗s |ft], where f ∗s is the critical value of the fundamental
index under state s.
Following Jeanne and Masson (2000), we assume that the fundamental index is a
linear function of the macroeconomic variables relevant for the policy maker’s decision.
12see Jeanne and Masson (2000) for details.
12
Empirical hypotheses
More specifically, ft = α
′mt, where mt is a vector of economic fundamentals, α is a vector
of constant coefficients and ′ is a transpose operator. Under this assumption, Jeanne and
Masson (2000) show that equation (2.1) can be linearized to the following form:
dt = δst + ϕ
′mt, st = 1, ..., n, (2.2)
where δst is a coefficient changing with the state, and ϕ is a vector of constant coefficients.
Under the rational expectation assumption, the sovereign CDS spread is determined
by the default probability of the underlying bond (dt) and other variables, such as the re-
covery rate of the defaulted bond and the investors’ risk appetite. We write the linearized
pricing equation for the sovereign CDS as follows:
CDSt = l + φdt + χ
′µt, (2.3)
where CDSt is the sovereign CDS spread, l and φ are constants, χ is a vector of constant
coefficients, and µt is a vector of determinants for the sovereign CDS spread other than
the default probability. Substitute for dt using equation (2.2), we get
CDSt = ϑst + ζmt + χ
′µt, (2.4)
where ϑst ≡ l + φδst , ζ ≡ φϕ′. Equation (2.4) suggests that under Hypothesis 1, the
sovereign CDS spread determination model can be approximated by a Markov regime
switching model in which the intercept changes across states but the slopes are always
constant.
Hypothesis 2 (changing policy focus): there is a unique rational expectations equi-
librium, given a particular set of focus fundamental variables of the government. But
the focus may change in the sample period.
Hypothesis 2 means that there is only one fixed point for the function g. In this case,
dt = F (ft, f
∗). Its linearized version can be written as
dt = a+ bft, (2.5)
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where a and b are constants.13 If the fundamental index ft is a linear function of relevant
fundamental variables, we will get a constant coefficient CDS pricing model. However,
under hypothesis 2, ft is not a linear function. Instead,
ft = α
′
jtmt, jt = 1, ..., J, (2.6)
where αjt is a vector of coefficients which change with a discrete state variable jt, J is the
number of possible combinations of target fundamental variables in the objective function
of the government, and mt is the collection of all the potentially relevant variables.
Equation (2.6) captures the idea that the set of fundamental variables in the government
objective function can change during a turbulent period. More specifically, there is an
unobservable latent state variable j whose value governs the changes in the preference of
the government. Note that equation (2.6) not only allows changes in the relative weights
of the same set of fundamental variables but also allows the set of relevant fundamental
variables to change across states. Changes in the set of relevant fundamental variables can
be modeled by setting different elements of αjt to zero under different states. Combining
equations (2.3), (2.5), and (2.6), we get
CDSt = ι+ κstmt + χ
′µt, (2.7)
where ι ≡ l+aφ and κst ≡ bφα′jt . Thus, under Hypothesis 2, it is the slope vector rather
than the intercept that changes across different states. Note that it is possible that
not only κ but also some elements of χ change with the state variable.14 For example,
the recovery rate also depends on the cost-benefit analysis of the defaulting government
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Therefore, our reasoning for regime-dependent parameter
changes in κ should also be applicable to the coefficients of determinants for the recovery
rate.
Hypothesis 3 (animal spirits 2): agents are only boundedly rational. They rely
on beliefs which are not related to the observable fundamentals if market uncertainty is
high.
The derivation of equations (2.4) and (2.7) depends on the rational expectation as-
13Following Jeanne and Masson (2000), we assume that ft = f̄ + cft, where f̄ and c are constants
and cft is of the first order. Under this assumption, a = F (f̄ , f
∗) and b = F1(f̄ , f
∗).
14In this case, we should add a subscript s to χ.
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sumption. More specifically, perfect rationality plays three important roles. First, it
makes the information content of observable fundamental variables reliable to be used
for forecasting the default probability of the sovereign bonds. Second, the forecast of the
default probability will be unbiased because the investors are perfectly rational. Third,
perfect rationality assures that the CDS spread will correctly incorporate all information
on the unbiased forecast of the default probability. If agents are not perfectly rational,
those three results will no longer be valid. If market uncertainty is low and cognitive
biases are small, a CDS spread determination equation based on those three results
may still be a good approximation of reality. In this case, the observable fundamental
variables will have explanatory power for the dynamics in the sovereign CDS spreads.
However, if market uncertainty is high and cognitive biases are large, it is no longer guar-
anteed that the observable fundamentals will have explanatory power for the dynamics
in the sovereign CDS spreads. It is because the information content of the fundamentals
can be highly distorted in a very uncertain environment, and there is no reason to use
the incorrect information to price the CDS contract. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is consis-
tent with a two-state regime switching model.15 In the less uncertain state, fundamental
variables have nonzero coefficients in the CDS spread determination equation. In the
more uncertain state, the coefficients of the fundamental variables are zero.
2.3. Variable and data description
2.3.1. The dependent variable: The sovereign CDS spread
The dependent variable in our empirical analysis is the sovereign CDS spread. A CDS
contract can be taken as an insurance contract against the credit event specified in the
contract.16 Its spread, expressed in basis points, is the insurance premium the protection
buyer has to pay. For example, a CDS spread of 20 basis points means the buyer of credit
15In our empirical models, we restrict the number of states to two to save degrees of freedom. Consider
only parameters to estimate in the transition matrix. Increasing the number of states from two to three
will increase the number of parameters to estimate from 12 to 72 in the two-step regime switching model.
Since our sample is relatively small, it is better to restrict the number of states to two. Two is also
the typical number of states specified in empirical regime switching models. For example, Jeanne and
Masson (2000) use a two-state model.
16More precisely, it is a quasi-insurance instrument. See Pan and Singleton (2008) and Dieckmann
and Plank (2011) for a more detailed description of the sovereign CDS contract.
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protection has to pay the seller an annual amount equal to 0.2 percent of the notional
value of the reference debt obligation.17 There are different credit events against which a
sovereign CDS contract can insure. Following Dieckmann and Plank (2011), we consider
only the CDS contracts on the credit event “complete restructuring”, since it is the
standard credit event in the European sovereign CDS contract. The contract maturity we
consider is 10 years because the 10-year contract is the most liquid one for the European
market. The spreads are quoted in US dollars, the standard currency for European
sovereign CDS contracts. Our sample covers weekly data on 10-year government bond
CDS spreads from September 15, 2008 to December 19, 2011. Importantly, our sample
covers the period after April 2010, which is not covered in the previous studies surveyed
in the introduction. Since sovereign debt problems in the sample countries become even
more concerned by the public in this period, this extension is particularly interesting.18
We start the sample from the collapse of Lehman Brothers since the study by Dieckmann
and Plank (2011) suggests that European samples before and after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers are very different. We include five Euro-area countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal and Spain) into our sample. Those five countries are widely believed to have
experienced a debt crisis in our sample period. Therefore, it is interesting to ask how
reliable are sovereign CDS spreads of those countries as indicators for their sovereign
credit risk during the crisis.
2.3.2. The covariates
Table 2.1 summarizes the covariates we use in the regression analysis. As we discussed,
the probability of a government’s default on its debt depends on the costs and benefits
of honoring its debt. Thus, rational investors will use variables that can affect the gov-
ernment’s cost-benefit analysis to conjecture the probability of a government default. In
addition, they will use this probability of default to price the sovereign CDS contract,
an insurance for the sovereign credit risk. Hence, we include variables that are com-
monly perceived to affect the country’s willingness to pay its debt as covariates in the
regression analysis. Note that we do not impose the rational expectations assumption
for the regression. Rather, we take statistical insignificance of the variables that should
have explanatory power to changes in the sovereign CDS spreads under the rational
17In our context, the reference debt is the sovereign bond.
18See OECD (2012).
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expectations assumption as a failure of the assumption.
Theoretically, the state and volatility of the economy may affect a country’s willing-
ness to pay its debt. Fiscal reforms necessary to honor the government’s debt obligation
can impose additional pressure on the already distressed economy. Therefore, when the
domestic economy is weak and unstable, the policy maker will be less willing to imple-
ment the reforms. Following the literature, we use the domestic stock market return
and volatility to proxy the economic state and volatility, respectively. In the rational ex-
pectations framework, one should expect the lower the stock market return or the more
volatile the return, the higher the sovereign CDS spread, reflecting the unwillingness of
the government to take fiscal reforms in an already weak and unstable economy. While
Dieckmann and Plank (2011) use the domestic stock price index return, we use the gross
return which also includes dividends. This choice is because changes in dividends also
contains information on the performance of firms, which affect the performance of the
economy. Another domestic variable we consider is the stock market performance of do-
mestic financial firms, the Dow Jones Total Market(DJTM) Financials index. Dieckmann
and Plank (2011) argue that this variable measures the private-to-public risk transfer due
to the costs of helping the distressed financial industry. That means we should expect a
higher sovereign CDS spread when the DJTM financials index is low.
Longstaff et al. (2011) suggest that changes in the global stock and bond markets can
explain a large part of the variation in an individual country’s sovereign CDS spread.
Empirical studies on the European sovereign CDS market (Fontana and Scheicher, 2010;
Dieckmann and Plank, 2011) find the same result. For this reason, we also include
indicators of developments in the global stock and bond markets as covariates. More
specifically, we follow Dieckmann and Plank (2011) to use the EuroStoxx 50 return and
MSCI World Financials index as indicators for global stock market developments. We
use 10-year German Bund rate and iTraxx Europe corporate CDS spread as indicators
for global bond market developments. Dieckmann and Plank (2011) use corporate bond
spreads rather than the iTraxx index to proxy European corporate credit spread. The
corporate credit spread is not significant in their time series analysis. By contrast,
Fontana and Scheicher (2010) find that the iTraxx index has strong explanatory power
in the equation for European sovereign CDS spreads. For this reason, we use the iTraxx
Europe index as the proxy for European corporate credit spread.
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Theoretically, including global variables into the analysis captures the international
spillover effect. The European Monetary Union(EMU)-wide stock market performance,
EuroStoxx 50 return, is a proxy for the state of the Euro-area economy. Through trade
linkages, the economic conditions in the other member countries can affect the home
country’s economy. This spillover effect need not to be fully captured by the current
domestic stock market return due to the fact that a bad union-wide economic condition
may affect the home economy with lags. More importantly, in a monetary union, a
sovereign country’s probability of default is partly affected by the willingness of the
other member countries to bail it out, and the other member countries’ willingness to
pay will depend on their own economic conditions. In this case, a decline in the union-
wide economy, proxied by the EuroStoxx 50 return, will increase the sovereign CDS
spread. Similarly, a bad state of the world financial industry may affect the willingness
of the international community to help an individual sovereign nation out of its debt
problem.19 Therefore, a decline in the World Financials index may increase the home
country’s sovereign CDS spread. A higher German Bund rate signals a higher rate
of economic growth in Germany. This favorable outcome can in turn help improve the
economic conditions of the other EMU countries and increase their willingness to help the
member countries which have debt problems. Even if Germany’s economic growth does
not affect other member countries’ economic performance, an improvement in its own
economy alone can significantly affect the market expectation of defaults by the Euro-
area periphery countries. This spillover effect is because Germany plays a leading role in
negotiations on the bailout plans. Thus, we expect that an increase in the German Bund
rate may reduce the sovereign CDS spreads of the periphery countries. The European
corporate CDS spread index, iTraxx, measures the corporate credit spread in Europe.
It contains a proxy for the overall state of the European economy since the recovery
rates of defaulted corporate bonds increase as the overall business climate improves
(Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001). Because lower recovery rates lead to higher corporate
CDS spreads, an increase in the iTraxx index implies a deteriorating macroeconomic
condition. In this sense, we expect sovereign CDS spreads to be positively related to
the iTraxx index. The iTraxx index also contains a proxy for investors’ risk appetite.
19We use a worldwide proxy for the performance of the financial sector rather than a Euro-area one
because the later is not available.
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When investors become more risk averse, they will ask for higher credit spread for both
corporate bonds and sovereign bonds. This again suggests a positive relationship between
iTraxx and the sovereign CDS spreads.
If changes in the iTraxx index fully capture changes in investors’ risk appetite, there is
no need to include an additional proxy for the risk appetite into the analysis. Fontana and
Scheicher (2010) find that the risk appetite proxy constructed from the Chicago Board
Options Exchange Market Volatility Index(VIX) is not significant when the iTraxx index
is included in the regression. Nevertheless, we add an additional proxy for investors’ risk
appetite for robustness. More specifically, we use the difference between the implied and
realized volatility of EuroStoxx 50 return as the proxy for the global risk premium. This
variable captures the pricing of the volatility risk, and therefore contains information on
the investors’ risk appetite (Longstaff et al., 2011). The implied volatility is the VSTOXX
index directly available from Datastream while the realized volatility is estimated by the
Garman and Klass (1980) estimator using a rolling 20-day window.
Finally, we include the nominal Euro-US Dollar exchange rate as a covariate. It
is measured by the amount of Euros per 100 US dollars. Thus, a higher value means
a depreciation of the Euro against the US dollar. We expect a positive sign of this
variable. In other words, a depreciation of the Euro increases the sovereign CDS spread.
The exchange rate is taken as a global variable since the exchange rate is determined by
the macroeconomic fundamentals of the EMU rather than a single member state.
2.3.3. Orthogonalization
Financial asset returns are highly correlated to each other (see Table 2.2). That means
including different asset returns into the regression can cause a multicollineararity prob-
lem which affects identification. Therefore, it is better to orthogonalize the variables
before using them as covariates in the regression. We follow Dieckmann and Plank
(2011) to construct the orthogonalized value of a variable as the sum of the estimated
intercept and residuals of a regression of that variable on other covariates correlated to
it. More specifically, domestic Financials index returns are regressed on the domestic
stock market returns and the World financials index return; the World Financials index
return is regressed on the global stock market return. Dieckmann and Plank (2011) do
not orthogonalize the domestic stock market returns and the European corporate credit
19
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spread. Fontana and Scheicher (2010) suggest that orthogonalizing the domestic stock
market returns also helps improve identification. Therefore, we orthogonalize the do-
mestic stock market returns by regressing them on the global stock market return and
construct the domestic stock market volatility indicators using the orthogonalized series.
Alexander and Kaeck (2008) find that changes in the iTraxx index can be explained by
changes in VSTOXX and changes in global stock and bond market conditions. Thus,
to facilitate identification, we orthogonalize the change in the iTraxx index by regress-
ing it on the change in the VSTOXX index, the global stock market return, the World
Financials index and the 10-year German Bund rate.
2.4. OLS regression analysis
Table 2.4 summarizes the estimation results of the following linear OLS regression model.
∆CDSt = ∆x
′
tβ + εt, (2.8)
where CDSt is the sovereign CDS spread, xt is the vector of covariates listed in Table
2.1, εt is the i.i.d. error term and ∆ is a first difference operator. The OLS regressions
assume that εt is independent of xt. We follow the previous studies to run the regression
with first differenced data.20 This approach facilitates comparison of the results. Con-
sistent with previous studies, our OLS results suggest that changes in the global bond
market conditions have strong explanatory power to changes in sovereign CDS spreads.
More specifically, increases in the 10-year German Bund rate significantly reduce the
sovereign CDS spreads of Ireland, Italy and Spain; increases in the European corporate
credit spreads significantly increase the sovereign CDS spreads of Greece, Ireland, Italy
and Spain; better Euro-area economic performance (a higher EuroStoxx 50 return) sig-
nificantly reduces the sovereign CDS spreads of Italy and Spain. These results are also
consistent with the theoretical expectation under the rational expectations assumption,
as we discussed in the last section. Consistent with the private-to-public risk transfer
hypothesis, improvement in local financial firms’ performance can reduce the sovereign
CDS spread. This reduction effect is statistically significant in Italy and Portugal. Signs
20See Table 2.3 for descriptive statistics of first differenced data.
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of the estimated coefficients of the World Financials index are positive, which is not only
different from the finding of Dieckmann and Plank (2011), but also different from the
theoretically expected sign we discussed in the last section. However, due to the econo-
metric deficiency of equation (2.8), both the point estimates and the inference based
on it are not reliable. Serial independence test results in Table 2.4 suggest that even if
there is just one regime, inference based on standard errors reported in Table 2.4 will be
distorted. If the single-regime assumption holds, the serial correlation problem can be
corrected by using the serial-correlation robust standard errors for inference. However,
if the single-regime assumption fails, even the serial independence test results in Table
2.4 will be unreliable.
Testing for regime switching is quite tricky because there are nuisance parameters that
are only identifiable under the alternative hypothesis of two regimes but not under the
null hypothesis of one regime. More specifically, a single-regime model can be represented
in three different ways. First, it can be taken as a model with two regimes with the same
regression coefficients. In this case, the probability associated with each regime is not
identifiable. In the other two ways, the single-regime model can be taken as a model with
two regimes under which the regression coefficients differ but one of the regime happens
with zero probability. In such ways of representation, the regression coefficients of the
regime which happen with zero probability are not identifiable. In addition, because
probabilities cannot be larger than one, there is a boundary condition imposed in the
estimation of the regime-switching model. Due to those facts, the typical likelihood ratio
test statistics do not follow the usual χ2 limiting distribution. Cho and White (2007)
propose a quasi-likelihood ratio test for regime switching and tabulated critical values at
the 5 percent level. Carter and Steigerwald (2011) point out that critical values reported
by Cho and White (2007) are based on 10,000 replications, but fewer than 100,000
replications do not produce stable critical values. They provide 5 percent critical values
based on 100,000 replications. Table 2.5 reports the quasi-likelihood ratio test statistics
for the null of one regime against an alternative of two regimes. Those values are far
larger than the critical values tabulated in Carter and Steigerwald (2011). Therefore, the
null hypothesis of a single regime is clearly rejected, and we should not make inference
based on the OLS model.
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2.5. Regime switching model analysis with instrumental variables
Like the OLS model, the standard regime switching models also assume that the error
term is independent of the covariates. However, in our context, this assumption may not
be plausible. It is possible that the insurance premium of sovereign borrowing affects the
borrowing cost and therefore affect the domestic economy. In this case, the local variables
are not exogenous and the standard maximum likelihood estimation of a regime switching
model will give us biased results. Kim (2009) proposes a two-step maximum likelihood










vt, S2t = 1, 2, ..., J2, (2.10)
where S1t and S2t are unobservable state variables; Zt = Ik ⊗ zt , Ik is a k × k identity
matrix with k being the dimension of xt, ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product21, and zt is
a q × 1 vector of instrumental variables; Σv,S2t is a k × k matrix; J1 and J2 denote the














ρS1t is a vector of correlation coefficients, and σe,S1t is the standard deviation of et.
Equation (2.9) is similar to equation (2.8) but now the parameters in β change with the
unobservable state variable S1t. The Lucas critique suggests that a regime shift in the
policy process governing equation (2.9) can lead to a regime shift in the dynamics of the
CDS spread determinants. Therefore, we allow regime shifts in equation (2.10) as well.
The unobservable state variable S2t is correlated to S1t according to the Lucas critique.
One way to estimate the system composed of equations (2.9) and (2.10) is to specify





Regime switching model analysis with instrumental variables
the joint process of S1t and S2t and estimate the model by a joint maximum likelihood
method. However, as pointed out by Kim (2009), such a joint estimation typically
has too many parameters to estimate and suffers from the ”curse of dimensionality”.
Furthermore, S2t will be correlated to but different from S1t if there is no perfect policy
credibility and the agents have to learn to respond to the policy. Kim (2009) suggests that
a two-step estimation approach which ignores the correlation between the state variables
suffers less from the “curse of dimensionality”. It has better finite sample performance
than the joint maximum likelihood estimation when the correlation between S1t and S2t
is not perfect. Moreover, it is more robust when the instrument variables are weak. The
two-step approach of Kim (2009) first estimates equation (2.10) as a standard regime
switching model. This procedure will give consistent estimates for γS2t and Σv,S2t since
there are no endogenous covariates in equation (2.10). The elements of the residual
vector v̂t are used as control variables in the second-step estimation of equation (2.9).
22
Kim (2009) proves that this two-step approach will give us consistent estimates for the
parameters in equation (2.9).23
To save degrees of freedom, we restrict the number of possible states for both S1t and
S2t to two. We instrument the local determinants of the CDS spread (∆sdrit, ∆svolt,
and ∆fdrit) by the second and third lags of those local variables and the lagged depen-
dent variable ∆CDSt−2 and ∆CDSt−3. Table 2.6 summarizes our two-step estimation
results of equation (2.9). Changes in the global bond market conditions (gbi and/or
itraxx) remain to be significant explanatory variables for changes in country-specific
sovereign CDS spreads under at least one regime. Moreover, the estimated signs of gbi
and itraxx are consistent with the theory under the rational expectations assumption.
More specifically, the 10-year German Bund rate (gbi) has a negative sign when signif-
icant, suggesting that investors expect a lower sovereign credit risk when Germany has
a better economic performance. The iTraxx index has a positive sign when significant.
As we discussed above, both a worse business climate in the European countries and
a higher degree of risk aversion can lead to a higher iTraxx index. Therefore, both a
worse economic state of EU and a higher degree of risk aversion can increase the prices
of insurances on the sovereign bonds. Similar to the finding by Fontana and Scheicher
22See the appendix of this chapter for a brief description of major steps of the second-step estimation.
23The second-step standard errors are biased due to the generated regressor problem. The standard
errors in the tables are corrected using the method provided by Kim (2009).
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(2010), the other proxy for investors’ risk appetite, vp, is not significant when the iTraxx
index is included as a regressor. The World Financials index is significantly negative
under one regime in Italy. This suggests that there is a private-to-public risk transfer
in Italy. Under the specific regime, a worse performance of the global financial sector
increases the possibility that foreign countries have to spend money to bail out their
own financial firms and hence less willing to help the home country. As a result, the
sovereign CDS spread increases. Note that it is the performance of the global rather
than local financial industry that matters. This finding suggests that compared to the
possibility that the Italian government has to bail out its domestic financial firms, the
market is more concerned about whether there will be international financial assistance
if Italy is in trouble. Under regime 2, ∆fgrot turns insignificant while the proxy for
domestic economic performance turns significant in Italy. This suggests that under this
regime, investors care more about the Italian economy than contingent government debt
for bailing out the financial sector. Note that the signs of the estimated coefficients of the
World Financials index are positive in some sample countries in some regimes. However,
those coefficients are not statistically significant. Hence, it is better to be interpreted
as no effect rather than a positive effect. Our results do not support Hypothesis 1, the
rational sunspot-equilibria interpretation of the animal spirits. The slopes rather than
intercepts are regime-dependent in the sample countries. Hypothesis 2 is also not plau-
sible, though it allows regime-dependent slope changes. Under one of the two regimes,
none of the indicators for economic performance and financial health are significant. In
this case, Hypothesis 2 will lead to the conclusion that both economic growth and finan-
cial stability become unimportant for the government, which is very unlikely to be true.
However, our results are consistent with Hypothesis 3. Increasing market uncertainty can
enlarge cognitive biases in the market-based indicators for economic and financial health,
making them useless for sovereign CDS pricing. Note that the iTraxx index contains a
market-based proxy for risk aversion under the rational expectations assumption. It be-
comes insignificant when all observable fundamentals become insignificant. This does
not mean that the degree of risk aversion does not matter. Instead, it means that the
market-based measure of investors’ risk appetite becomes very imprecise when market
uncertainty is high and the rational expectations approximation is far from reality.
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2.5.1. Tests for endogeneity and serial independence
Kim (2009) suggests that endogeneity of the explanatory variables can be tested by the
standard Wald test using the second-step estimation outputs. More specifically, in the
two-step estimation, endogeneity is captured by the first-step regression residuals of the
endogenous variables on the instrumental variables. These residuals are used in the
second-step regression as control variables to eliminate the endogeneity. Therefore, we
can test for endogeneity by testing the statistical significance of the first-step residuals in






tθS1t + ωt, S1t = 1, 2, ..., J1, (2.11)
where θS1t is a vector of regime-dependent coefficients, v̂t is the first-step estimate for vt,
and ωt is an i.i.d. normal random variable given a specific value of S1t. The variance of
ωt changes across regimes. We denote it by σω,S1t .
24 No endogeneity means θ1 = θ2 =
... = θJ1 = 0. Under the null hypothesis of no endogeneity, the asymptotic distribution





2 = ... = θ̂
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J1
]′ is the vector of estimated values for θS1t , S1t = 1, 2, ..., J1; h is the
dimension of θ̂. Table 2.7 summarizes the Wald test results. The null hypothesis of
variable exogeneity is rejected in all sample countries, except Greece. This verifies the
importance of controlling for potential endogeneity.
Since we cannot directly apply the Hamilton (1996) test for autoregression to our
regime-switching model with endogenous variables, we test for autoregression by adding
the lagged dependent variable, ∆CDSt−1, to the second-step equation and test the sta-
tistical significance of the autoregressive term. In order to avoid correlation between
higher-order lags of ∆CDSt and ∆CDSt−1, we exclude them from the original instru-
ment variable set. That is, we only use lags of the local variables as instrument variables.
Table 2.8 summarizes the estimated coefficients of ∆CDSt−1 and their standard errors.
The lagged dependent variable is not significant in any sample country under either
regime, which suggests no serial correlation in the original model.
24See Kim (2009) for details.
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2.5.2. The endogeneity of the performance of global financial sector
In the econometric analysis above, we considered only the potential endogeneity of
the local variables. Now we consider the potential endogeneity of a global variable:
the change in the performance of the global financial sector, ∆fgrot. Such endo-
geneity can arise if financial firms outside the home country are highly involved in
the trading of the specific country’s sovereign CDS contracts.25 Taking fgro as an
additional endogenous variable, we re-estimate the regime switching model. We use
the second and third lags of ∆sdrit,∆svolt,∆fdrit,∆fgrot and the lagged dependent
variable ∆CDSt−2 and ∆CDSt−3 to instrument the potentially endogenous variables
(∆sdrit,∆svolt,∆fdrit,∆fgrot ). We test the endogeneity of fgro based on the new
estimation results. As we mentioned in the last subsection, the test for endogeneity
is equivalent to the test for the statistical significance of the corresponding first-stage
residuals. Table 2.9 summarizes the test results. Those results suggest that changes in
the Irish and Portuguese sovereign CDS spreads have significantly affected changes in
the performance of financial firms outside those two countries at least under one regime.
Table 2.10 reports the estimation results for Ireland the Portugal, taking fgro as an
endogenous variable. The previous result that changes in the fundamental variables do
not explain changes in the Irish or Portuguese sovereign CDS spreads under regime 2
is unchanged. This means that the type-2 animal spirits of investors are indeed the
driver of changes in the Irish and Portuguese sovereign CDS spreads under regime 2.
Changes in the Euro-Dollar rate and the iTraxx index significantly affect changes in the
Irish sovereign CDS spread under regime 1. More specifically, a depreciation of the Euro
relative to the US Dollar and an increase in the European corporate CDS spread lead to
an increase in the Irish sovereign CDS spread. The significant positive sign of the iTraxx
index suggests that either a worse business climate increases the sovereign credit risk or
a higher degree of risk aversion increases the insurance premium for the sovereign bor-
rowing. In Portugal, under regime 1, the 10-year German Bund rate appears to be the
only significant fundamental driver of the sovereign CDS spread. The negative sign of
gbi suggests that a larger increase in the German growth rate implies a higher increase in
the probability that the EMU will provide financial support to the Portugal government





We have studied the determinants of changes in the sovereign CDS spreads of five Euro-
area countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) after the failure of Lehman
Brothers. Two distinct regimes under which the coefficients of the determinants differ
are identified.
On the one hand, under regime 2, the usual determinants of changes in the sovereign
CDS spreads of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal lose their explanatory power.26 We ar-
gue that the animal spirits; that is, the psychological movements of cognitively limited
investors are the key drivers of the sovereign CDS spreads in such situations. This has
important implications for both policy makers and academic researchers. As a widely-
used indicator for the sovereign credit risk, the sovereign CDS spread can be highly
distorted in the sense that it can be completely disconnected from the country’s funda-
mental economic movements. In the rational expectations framework, the existence of
non-fundamental determinants of sovereign CDS spreads does not necessarily mean that
the CDS spreads cannot predict sovereign defaults. That is because non-fundamental
sunspot shocks to investors’ expectation can lead to self-fulfilling sovereign debt crises.
If the market believes that a debt crisis is under way, it will happen. And if the market
participants are perfectly rational, the sovereign default probabilities will be correctly
included in the pricing of the corresponding sovereign CDS spreads. However, our em-
pirical results do not support the story of rational self-fulfilling debt crises. Rather,
there are periods in which the boundedly rational market participants fail to price the
sovereign credit risk correctly. In this case, the sovereign CDS spread is not very useful
for evaluating the sovereign credit risk.
On the other hand, our results also suggest that there are periods in which the funda-
mental variables matter. In addition, the estimated effects of those fundamental variables
reflect at least bounded rationality of the market participants. More specifically, we find
that in the periods when the investors behave more rationally, the global bond market
conditions are particularly important for the pricing of the sovereign CDS spreads. A
better economic prospect of Germany or a better European-wide business climate implies
a higher chance that other union members will be willing to provide financial support
26Under this regime, the market is more turbulent in the sense that the conditional variance of changes
in the sovereign CDS spreads is larger than under regime 2. See Tables 2.6 and 2.10.
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for the fiscally distressed countries. Therefore, the market confidence on sovereign bor-
rowing will be enhanced and sovereign CDS spreads decrease. A depreciation of the
Euro against the US dollar significantly increases Italian and Spanish sovereign CDS
spreads. This result also suggests that the Euro-area economic prospect can affect an
individual member country’s sovereign credit risk. It is because the depreciation of the
Euro can signal a weaker Euro-area economy. Another interesting finding is that there
are periods in which traders of the Italian sovereign CDS contracts are concerned by the
performance of the global financial industry. A worse performance of the global finan-
cial industry increases the probability that foreign countries will have to bail out their
own financial sectors and become less willing to provide financial aids for Italian fiscal
reforms. By contrast, in some other periods, investors in the market of Italian sovereign
CDS contracts only cares about the domestic economic performance of Italy, and pay
little attention to the performance of the global financial sector. The reason for this
change in investors’ concern can be an interesting topic for future research.
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Table 2.1: Variable definitions
Variable Definition
forex Nominal Euro to US Dollar exchange rate, the amount of Euros per 100 US Dollars
stoxx EuroStoxx 50 return (orthogonalized), percentage point
gbi 10-year benchmark German Bund interest rate, basis point
itraxx iTraxx Europe 10-year CDS spread (orthogonalized), basis point
vp Volatility risk premium, percentage point
fgro MSCI World Financials index return (orthogonalized), percentage point
sdri DJTM domestic stock market return (orthogonalized), percentage point
svol GARCH(1,1) Domestic stock market volatility, percentage point
fdri DJTM Financials index return (orthogonalized), percentage point
Notes: All data are from Datastream.
See the texts for detailed description on the orthogonalization of variables.
The volatility risk premium is proxied by the difference between the implied volatility and the Garman-Klass
realized volatility of EuroStoxx 50.
29
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Table 2.2: Correlation between stock market returns
Greece Ireland Italy
stoxx fgro sdri fdri stoxx fgro sdri fdri stoxx fgro sdri fdr
stoxx 1.00 1.00 1.00
fgro 0.84 1.00 0.84 1.00 0.84 1.00
sdri 0.68 0.59 1.00 0.77 0.77 1.00 0.95 0.81 1.00
fdri 0.61 0.53 0.95 1.00 0.59 0.63 0.74 1.00 0.89 0.78 0.96 1.00
Portugal Spain
stoxx fgro sdri fdri stoxx fgro sdri fdri
stoxx 1.00 1.00
fgro 0.84 1.00 0.84 1.00
sdri 0.78 0.64 1.00 0.92 0.77 1.00
fdri 0.58 0.51 0.73 1.00 0.88 0.78 0.97 1.00
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Table 2.4: OLS results
Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
constant 0.40 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.02
(0.30) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01)
forex -2.70 3.99 2.98** 1.23 2.43**
(26.43) (3.29) (1.32) (3.16) (1.28)
stoxx -10.07 -0.35 -0.69** -1.28 -0.80**
(7.26) (0.87) (0.36) (0.87) (0.34)
gbi -0.46 -0.75** -0.55*** -0.63 -0.40***
(2.81) (0.35) (0.14) (0.34) (0.13)
itraxx 10.01** 1.18** 0.77*** 0.55 1.01***
(4.49) (0.55) (0.24) (0.55) (0.21)
vp 2.05 1.75 0.60 1.56 0.57
(8.16) (0.99) (0.40) (0.97) (0.39)
fgro 4.24 1.43 0.48 2.71*** 0.74
(8.27) (1.07) (0.42) (0.99) (0.40)
sdri -8.04 -0.27 -2.41*** -5.76*** -2.45***
(4.52) (0.83) (0.92) (1.20) (0.67)
svol -0.00 0.06 0.18 1.74*** 0.53**
(0.66) (0.36)) (0.10) (0.66) (0.23)
fdri -4.19 -0.24 -1.64*** -2.12*** -0.85
(8.06) (0.23) (0.61) (0.63) (0.76)
Adjusted R-squared 0.29 0.16 0.43 0.32 0.42
Serial independence 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.03
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***,** denotes significance at one and five
percent level, respectively.
Serial independence is the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test p value for serial correlation
up to two orders.
Table 2.5: Tests for regime switching
Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
test statistics 462.6 115.1 75.96 157.8 75.48
Notes: Test statistics are Cho and White (2007) Quasi-Likelihood Ra-
tio test statistics.
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Table 2.7: Endogeneity tests (local variables only)
Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
Wald statistics 1.36 20.39 14.25 13.98 16.97
p value 0.97 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.01
Notes: Testing for endogeneity of the local variables, taking the global
variables as exogenous.
Table 2.8: Serial correlation tests for the regime
switching model
Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
regime 1 0.01 -0.03 0.08 0.07 0.09
(0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.06) (0.12)
regime 2 -0.21 1.40 -0.33 0.35 -0.02
(0.73) (27.4) (0.27) (0.22) (0.34)
Notes: Estimated coefficients of ∆CDSt−1 with standard errors
in parentheses. ***,** denotes significance at one and five percent
level, respectively.
Table 2.9: Tests for the endogeneity of fgro
Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
regime 1 -0.11 -0.01 0.00 0.07** -0.01
(0.14) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
regime 2 -2.14 1.18** 0.00 0.09 -0.06
(8.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.34) (0.05)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***,** denotes significance
at one and five percent level, respectively.
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Table 2.10: Regime switching model results-local
variables and fgro instrumented
Ireland Portugal
regime 1 regime 2 regime 1 regime 2
constant 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.11
(0.02) (1.11) (0.02) (0.43)
forex 4.38*** -0.86 3.22 -5.26
(1.68) (122.8) (1.79) (35.73)
stoxx -0.71 1.40 -0.37 -4.36
(0.48) (34.61) (0.54) (12.61)
gbi -0.34 -1.67 -0.49** -0.91
(0.18) (10.85) (0.20) (4.02)
itraxx 1.07*** 0.74 0.59 4.85
(0.29) (21.62) (0.32) (6.75)
vp -0.10 4.51 0.24 3.57
(0.48) (27.53) (0.56) (13.63)
fgro -0.87 25.38 -1.14 7.25
(0.79) (201.3) (1.51) (25.01)
sdri -0.16 -1.00 0.57 -3.35
(0.20) (132.1) (0.61) (11.37)
svol -0.30 5.39 -0.91 -1.37
(0.21) (51.48) (0.96) (33.96)
fdri 0.16 -40.80 -0.60 1.55
(0.94) (188.7) (1.02) (39.63)
pii 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.92
σω 0.20 0.65 0.15 0.55
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***,** denotes signifi-
cance at one and five percent level respectively.
pii denotes the probability of staying under regime i in the next
period if i is the current regime.
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2.7. Appendix
In this appendix, we show the major steps of the second-step estimation for our two-state
model. Our purpose is to estimate βS1t , θS1t , σe,S1t and pij, the transition probability











and γS2t , respectively.
Using equations (2.11) and (2.12), we can derive the conditional density function of
∆CDSt for given values of S1t and S2t. More specifically, for j1 = 1, 2 and j2 = 1, 2, the











′θj1}2}, where λ1 denotes
the vector of parameters to be estimated in the second step, and λ̂2 denotes the vector
of estimated parameters in the first step.
Using the standard smoother for the regime switching model, we can get, from the
first-step estimation, Prob(S2t = 1|∆x̃T ) and Prob(S2t = 2|∆x̃T ) , where ∆x̃t denotes
the historical information on ∆x until time t, T is the end of the sample period.27
We can calculate the conditional densities for j1 = 1, 2: f(∆CDSt|∆Zt,∆xt, S1t =
j1;λ1, λ̂2) = f(∆CDSt|∆Zt,∆xt, S1t = j1, S2t = 1;λ1, λ̂2) × Prob(S2t = 1|∆x̃T ) +
f(∆CDSt|∆Zt,∆xt, S1t = j1, S2t = 2;λ1, λ̂2)× Prob(S2t = 2|∆x̃T ).
Denote the historical information on ∆CDSt until period t − 1 by ∆C̃DSt−1. If
Prob(S1t = j1|∆C̃DSt−1,∆x̃T ) is known, we can calculate the predictive density of
∆CDSt by the following equation:
f(∆CDSt|∆C̃DSt−1,∆xt;λ1, λ̂2) = f(∆CDSt|∆Zt,∆xt, S1t = 1;λ1, λ̂2)×Prob(S1t =
1|∆C̃DSt−1,∆x̃T )+f(∆CDSt|∆Zt,∆xt, S1t = 2;λ1, λ̂2)×Prob(S1t = 2|∆C̃DSt−1,∆x̃T ).28
However, we do not know Prob(S1t = j1|∆C̃DSt−1,∆x̃T ). Given initial values
Prob(S10 = j1|∆C̃DS0,∆x̃T ) , we can calculate the filtered probabilities as follows:
Prob(S1t = 1|∆ ˜CDSt−1,∆x̃T ) = p11Prob(S1,t−1 = 1|∆C̃DSt−1,∆x̃T )+p21Prob(S1,t−1 =
2|∆C̃DSt−1,∆x̃T ).
27See Hamilton (1994) for details on the standard regime switching model.
28Note that in our model, Zt includes past values of CDSt and xt.
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Similarly, Prob(S1t = 2|∆ ˜CDSt−1,∆x̃T ) = p12Prob(S1,t−1 = 1|∆C̃DSt−1,∆x̃T ) +
p22Prob(S1,t−1 = 2|∆C̃DSt−1,∆x̃T ).
The probabilities can be updated using the following equation:
Prob(S1t = j1|∆C̃DSt,∆x̃T ) = f(∆CDSt|∆Zt,∆xt,S1t=j1;λ1,λ̂2)×Prob(S1t=j1|∆C̃DSt−1,∆x̃T )
f(∆CDSt|∆C̃DSt−1,∆xt;λ1,λ̂2)
,
where j1 = 1, 2.









Taylor (2009) suggests that government policies could be sources of financial crises.
In this chapter, we focus on the impact of one particular type of government policy,
that is, central bank’s interest rate policy, on financial stability. More specifically, we
investigate how the interactions between various shocks and central bank’s interest rate
rules dynamically affect the adverse selection problem faced by financial intermediaries.
To that end, we build a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model with two
types of borrowers. One is a gambler, who borrows to invest in a fixed-supply gambling
asset. The other is an entrepreneur, who borrows to pay the set-up cost for production.
Borrowers are protected by the limited liability law. Limited liability together with
fixed-supply can generate a bubble in the gambling asset market (Allen and Gale, 2000).
When there is a bubble, lending to gamblers generates expected losses. In this case, there
are two reasons why the gamblers still get loans from financial intermediaries (Barlevy,
2008). First, lending to entrepreneurs generates expected profits. Second, there is no
screening between gamblers and entrepreneurs.30 Without screening in the financial
intermediation sector, a persistent decrease in the proportion of entrepreneurs in the
29This chapter is coauthored with Hans Blommestein and Sylvester Eijffinger.
30Empirical studies (Giot and Schwienbacher, 2003; Bertoni et al., 2011) suggest that even venture
capital firms which are supposed to have a strong ability to select good borrowers do not really select
good firms. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) suggest that the expansion of the financial intermediation sector
in the run-up to crises causes overcapacity in the financial industry. Since many new intermediaries enter
the market with less experience during the expansionary period, one should expect a weaker average
ability to screen the borrowers. Moreover, the theoretical model of Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006)
shows that financial intermediaries will optimally choose not to screen the borrowers if the number of
new loan applicants is sufficiently large.
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borrower pool can accumulate huge losses for financial intermediaries. This chapter
links the central bank’s interest rate policy to changes in the borrower pool in a general
equilibrium framework. More specifically, a change in the interest rate affects liabilities
of both types of borrowers in the same way, but affects the payoffs of the assets they
buy in a different way. On the one hand, the payoff of the gambling asset is exogenously
determined by the lotteries. On the other hand, the payoffs of the firms set up by the
entrepreneurs are endogenously determined by a number of factors including the interest
rate. Therefore, a change in the interest rate can disproportionately change the expected
cash flows for gamblers and entrepreneurs. The difference in the changes of expected cash
flows leads to a difference in the market entry decisions, which changes the proportion
of entrepreneurs in the borrower pool.
The key result of our model is that the central bank’s interest rate policy can reduce
the riskiness of the loan portfolio in the short run, while persistently increase the riskiness
in the long run. More specifically, by lowering the interest rate, the central bank makes
debt repayment easier for both entrepreneurs and gamblers. This encourages entry of
both types of investors. Our quantitative analysis suggests that entry of entrepreneurs
may increase more than entry of gamblers in the short run, which means that the propor-
tion of entrepreneurs in the pool of new loan applicants increases in the short run. Since
loans to entrepreneurs are less risky than loans to gamblers, the loan portfolio becomes
less risky in the short run. However, more entry of entrepreneurs intensifies competition
in the production sector and reduces their future profits. This deters entrepreneurial
entry in the long run. By contrast, future payoffs of the lotteries are exogenously de-
termined and are not affected by the current-period entry of gamblers.31 Therefore, the
proportion of entrepreneurs persistently stays at low levels in the long run.
Taylor (2009) argues that deviations from the Taylor rule can be a source of financial
crisis. We find that expansionary monetary policy shocks can persistently worsen the
borrower pool faced by financial intermediaries in the long run. This is consistent with
Taylor’s argument. However, quantitative results of our model also suggest that sticking
to the Taylor rule is not sufficient to eliminate financial crises. Actually, if the economy
31Strictly speaking, not only future payoffs but also asset prices affect entry decisions. Competition
can push up the price of the gambling asset. However, it also pushes up the cost of entering the
production sector, which increases the value of the firms. Therefore, competition-induced changes in
asset prices are limited in relative terms. As a result, the effect of such changes in relative asset prices
on the proportion of entrepreneurs is also limited.
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is hit by a negative productivity shock, a central bank which deviates from the Taylor
rule by not reacting to output fluctuations can reduce long-run financial risk.
The financial accelerator model (Bernanke et al., 1999) also links productivity shocks
to financial intermediation in a general equilibrium macroeconomic framework.32 How-
ever, there is no distinctive difference between the short-run and long-run effects of shocks
in the financial accelerator model. As we discussed, the distinction between the short
run and long run is important. Moreover, the financial accelerator model considers only
one type of borrower (the entrepreneur) and assumes that the number of entrepreneurs is
fixed. Our model instead features endogenous entry of both gamblers and entrepreneurs.
It enables us to study the dynamic changes in the borrower pool faced by financial
intermediaries.
Our modeling of the production sector is related to the macroeconomic model with
endogenous firm entry by Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2008), but differs
in several important respects. In Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2008),
there are no financial frictions and therefore no role for financial intermediation. In
our model, there is a financial friction and firms must rely on financial intermediaries
to buy goods necessary to start their business. This specification enables us to study
the feedback effect from the real sector to the financial sector. In Ghironi and Melitz
(2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2008), firms exit exogenously at a constant rate. In our model,
the exit of firms is endogenously determined by their ability to repay their debt. One
particularly important difference is that nominal wage is sticky in our model, whereas
it is flexible in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2008). Bilbiie et al. (2008)
find that entrepreneurial entry initially decreases after an expansionary monetary policy
shock. This happens because output expansion created by the interest rate shock pushes
up the real wage. The higher real wage not only makes entrepreneurial entry more costly
but also decreases profits after entry. Therefore, fewer entrepreneurs want to enter.
However, as suggested by Rotemberg (2008), if the nominal wage is sticky, the rise in the
real wage will be more modest. As a result, profits could rise rather than fall. Therefore,
entrepreneurial entry can rise despite the increase in entry cost. Since entrepreneurial
entry affects the borrower pool faced by financial intermediaries, it is crucial to model
32See Allen and Gale (2007) for a survey of partial equilibrium models which also link real shocks to
financial stability.
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wage setting in a more realistic way.
A popular claim in media and policy discussions is that speculation in the secondary
financial market is a source of financial crisis. Very often this claim is used to justify
financial suppression, for example through restrictions on secondary market trading.
While fire sales in the secondary market can trigger a financial crisis (Allen and Gale,
2004, 2007), banning secondary market trading is far from a justified solution to prevent
financial crises. Our model suggests that productivity shocks originating from the real
sector can lead to a financial crisis even if there is a ban on secondary market trading of
the gambling asset.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 solves the model.
Section 4 displays and discusses impulse responses of the model under different shocks.
Section 5 studies the robustness of the qualitative results to sticky interest rate pass-
through. Section 6 concludes.
3.2. The model
To facilitate the comparison of impulse responses in our model to those in the standard
literature, we incorporate nominal (goods price stickiness and wage stickiness) and real
frictions (habit formation in consumption and monopolistic competition in production)
in the standard new Keynesian model. Aggregation is very difficult if we have both price
stickiness and endogenous entry and exit of firms in one sector. Therefore, we separate
those two features into two different sectors. First, we have a consumption goods sector
with sticky prices and a fixed mass of firms. Second, we have an intermediate goods sector
with flexible prices and endogenous entering and exiting of firms. The consumption
goods producers use intermediate goods for production while the intermediate goods
producers use labor for production. Entering entrepreneurs in the intermediate goods
sector must hire labor and buy consumption goods to set up their firms. The entry
cost in terms of wage payment is covered by the shareholders or households. The entry
cost in terms of consumption goods is covered by loans from financial intermediaries.
Besides entrepreneurs, financial intermediaries also face another type of borrower, the
gambler. Gamblers use the borrowed amount to buy an asset of which the payoff is
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completely exogenously determined by lotteries. In each period, financial intermediaries
receive an installment repayment from the borrowers if there is no default. Households
make decisions on labor supply, goods consumption, investment in deposits and new
stocks of firms in the intermediate goods sector. They receive profits and wage payments
from the firms and interest payments from the financial intermediaries. Finally, there is
a central bank which sets nominal money market interest rates. Figure 3.1 summarizes
the interrelationships between the agents.
3.2.1. Firms
Consumption goods producers
There is a continuum of symmetric monopolistically competitive producers for the con-
sumption goods, each producing a differentiated variety z ∈ [0, 1].33 The production
function of firm z is yt(z) = Xt(z), where Xt(z) is the amount of aggregate intermediate
goods employed in the consumption goods production process of firm z.









, where 1 < γ  ∞ is the elasticity of substitution across the
consumption goods, ct(z) is the demand for individual firm z’s goods. It follows from the













is the ideal consumer price index (CPI).
We assume there is price inertia in the consumption goods sector. More specifi-
cally, we follow Rotemberg (1982) and Bilbiie et al. (2008) to assume that the con-
sumption goods producer z has to pay a price setting cost of the form pact(z) =
η
2
[Φt(z)− 1]2 pt(z)yt(z), where η ∈ [0,∞) and Φt(z) ≡ pt(z)pt−1(z) is firm z’s gross price
inflation. Following Erceg et al. (2000), we assume that the government provides a sub-
sidy τc =
1
γ−1 to the firm’s output so that the distortion from monopolistic competition
in the consumption goods sector is eliminated. Therefore, firm z’s periodic real profit is




= {(1 + τc)pt(z)− PMt −
η
2
[Φt(z)− 1]2 pt(z)}yt(z)/PCt ,
33The fixed number of varieties has been normalized to unity.
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where PMt is the price index of the aggregate intermediate goods, and the second equality
comes from our specification of the consumption goods production function.
One purpose of introducing the subsidy in the model is to facilitate comparison
of the quantitative results with those of Bilbiie et al. (2008) since they introduce a
government subsidy to eliminate the distortion from monopolistic competition in their
model. Moreover, if the distortion from monopolistic competition is eliminated, the
central bank’s monetary policy only has to concern about frictions from nominal rigidities
and the financial sector. Note that given nominal rigidities in our model, the distortion
from monopolistic competition can be completely eliminated by the subsidy only in the
steady state. The interactions between monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities
still affect the transitional dynamics.





s(z)], where Λt,s ≡ βs−t(UCs/UCt) is the stochastic discount factor, β
is the subjective discount factor, and UCs is the marginal utility of consumption in period
s. Following Bilbiie et al. (2008), we interpret the real price setting cost as the amount of
marketing materials needed to set the price and assume that the basket of the marketing
materials has the same composition as the consumption basket. Therefore, the demand
function for firm z’s goods is yt(z) = [
pt(z)
PCt
]−γYt. Maximizing the NPV of firm z’s profit
flows subject to the demand function, we obtain the optimal pricing condition for the
consumption good producer firm z: pt(z) = µt(z)P
M
t , where µt(z) is the markup over






























is the gross consumer price inflation rate. Note that in the steady
state with no price adjustment, the markup is one. This result obtains because the
monopolistic distortion is eliminated by the production subsidy.
Imposing symmetry, it is easy to see that the producer price inflation rate of the con-
sumption goods sector is also the CPI inflation rate. More specifically, when producers
are symmetric, the aggregate pricing equation of the consumption goods sector reduces










Similar to the consumption goods production sector, the intermediate goods production
sector also features monopolistic competition. However, different from the consumption
goods sector, we assume that the number of varieties of the intermediate goods can
change over time due to free entry and exit. More specifically, we assume that there is
a continuum of intermediate goods producers, each producing a different variety ω ∈ Ω.









where 1 < ε∞ is the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods. Hence, the












1−ε is the aggregate price index
of the intermediate goods.
Following Ghironi and Melitz (2005), we assume that the production function of the
intermediate goods firm ω is xt(ω) = ωZtlt(ω), where lt(ω) is the labor input for produc-
tion, Zt is the stochastic aggregate productivity level, ω is the individual productivity
level which is drawn after entry and remains fixed thereafter. Hence, the unit labor
cost for intermediate goods production is wt/ωZt, where wt is the aggregate real wage
rate. We assume that there is no price adjustment cost in the intermediate goods sector.
Similar to the consumption goods sector, there is an output subsidy τm =
1
ε−1 so that
distortion from monopolistic competition is eliminated. Given those assumptions, the
real gross profit function of the intermediate goods firm ω is
mt(ω) = [(1 + τm)p
m(ω)/PCt − wt/ωZt]xt(ω)
= [(1 + τm)p
m








where the second equation follows from firms setting their price equal to the marginal
cost, pmt (ω) =
wtPCt
ωZt
, due to the subsidy; the third equation is the result of substituting
in the demand function xt(ω) = [
pmt (ω)
PMt
]−εXt. Obviously, firms with a higher individual
productivity ω earn more profit.
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Aggregation, and entry and exit of intermediate goods producers
To enter the market, the intermediate goods producers have to pay a sunk cost. The
sunk cost is composed of two parts. One part is an amount of effective labor cost (wt
Zt
f ew)
which is covered by the firm’s own money.34 The other part is the cost of purchasing
a fixed amount (f e) of aggregate consumption goods covered by loans from financial
intermediaries.35 The loan is then repaid by installments in each period. As we shall see
in subsection 3.2.2, the periodic installment (ft) is predetermined and unaffected by an
individual firm’s productivity. This specification suggests that the probability that firm
ω is able to pay the full amount of installment is higher when its individual productivity
ω is higher. Therefore, there is a cutoff individual productivity level ω∗t , which satisfies
mt(ω
∗
t ) = ft. Note that we add a time subscript to the cutoff individual productivity as
it varies with aggregate productivity.
We assume that firms that fail to pay the full amount of the installment will go
bankrupt. This assumption implies that the bankruptcy law imposes a strict solvency
constraint on the borrowers so that all defaulting borrowers will be forced to go bankrupt
even if some of them may be able to repay the debt in the future, once the aggregate
economic situation has become more favorable. In practice, bankruptcy laws differ across
countries. For example, bankruptcy laws in the UK are much stricter than in the US. In
the US, there is Chapter 11, which allows the firms in financial distress to reorganize and
continue to operate afterward. We do not model this for tractability reasons. However,
the existence of a soft budget constraint is likely to deter the entry of entrepreneurs and
worsen the borrower pool faced by financial intermediaries, since keeping more firms in
the market could reduce the expected profit flows for an entering entrepreneur. Moreover,
a soft budget constraint could encourage gambling since it gives gamblers a better chance
to survive longer and benefit more from taking the gamble. In this sense, introducing
a soft budget constraint may strengthen rather than weaken the results of the current
model.
We further assume that there is limited liability which means that the firms do not
have to pay an amount more than their profits to the lender when they go bankrupt.
Therefore, those firms which expect to earn profits less than the installment will exit the
34More precisely, it is indirectly covered by the households owning the firms.
35This technical assumption simplifies aggregation because the principal amount of the debt is the
same for firms entering the market in different periods under this assumption.
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market without production since they can earn nothing from producing. This is different
from the traditional financial accelerator model (Bernanke et al., 1999) in which the firms’
current period profit is modeled as a collateral for the loan. However, it is consistent
with the theoretical model of Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006), which suggests that if
the number of new loan applications is sufficiently large, financial intermediaries will
optimally choose not to screen the borrowers and require no collateral from them.
With these assumptions, we can aggregate the intermediate goods production sec-
tor in the same way as Melitz (2003) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005) have done. More
specifically, we assume that the intermediate goods producers draw their individual pro-
ductivity levels from a Pareto distribution G(ω) = 1 − (1/ω)k over [1,∞). Then, an
average productivity level defined as




= [k/(k − ε+ 1)]1/(ε−1)ω∗t
can summarize all the information on the individual productivity distributions relevant
for all macroeconomic variables. Essentially, the intermediate goods producer block of
our model with Nt firms with heterogeneous productivity is isomorphic to one where Nt
representative firms with productivity ωmt produce the intermediate goods. Particularly,







t ), which is a result of Melitz (2003).
Following Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2008), we assume that there
is a time-to-build lag such that the firms start producing only one period after paying
the sunk cost. Firms with an individual productivity level higher than ω∗t will not go
bankrupt, so the firm survival rate in period t is θt ≡ 1−G(ω∗t ) = (1/ω∗t )k. Therefore, an






s ) − fs]}.
Free entry in the intermediate goods production sector requires that the average value





Denoting the number of new entrants in the intermediate goods sector by N et , we get the
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3.2.2. Financial intermediation
In each period, there are a number (N rt ) of investors who come to the financial interme-




t of those investors are entrepreneurs who
will invest the borrowed money in the intermediate goods sector to start their business.
The other (1 − φt)N rt investors are gamblers who will invest the borrowed money on a
pure gambling asset of which the supply is fixed for each period. The loan from the
intermediaries is paid back by a periodic installment (fs) from one period after the bor-
rowing. We introduce the one-period lag here to allow for a time-to-build lag in the real
sector. We assume that the financial intermediaries do not screen out gamblers from the
borrower pool. As a result, the borrowing amount and periodic repayment will be the
same for both entrepreneurs and gamblers. Therefore, the borrowed money of a gambler
in period t is f e which is equal to the part of sunk cost of an intermediate goods producer
covered by a loan from the financial intermediaries.
One period after purchase, the buyer of the gambling asset can participate in a
lottery, which gives a payoff g with probability λ and a payoff zero with probability 1−λ.
Conditional on winning the lottery, the owner of the gambling asset can participate in
the same lottery again in the next period. The gambler can keep participating in the
lottery until he fails to win the lottery. Denote the real gambling asset price by prt . Then,
the number of gambling asset bought by a gambler is f
e
prt
. Similar to the entrepreneurs,
gamblers will go bankrupt if they cannot pay the full amount of installment, and their
profit is zero when bankrupt due to protection by the limited liability law. Therefore,









where Prob(x) denotes the probability of event x.36 Assuming that the gamblers have
to pay an entrance fee37 (f g) for the gambling market with own money, we can write









− fs)]} = f g.
36Here the analysis is simplified by assuming that the investors cannot sell the assets in a secondary
market. In other words, they are locked up after purchasing. Ofek and Richardson (2003) provide
evidence that lockup agreements are responsible for the buildup of the internet bubble. In practice,
the gamblers could be the existing business owners who starts excessively risky new projects with easy
money from the financial intermediaries. Typically, selling of the projects involves very high liquidation
costs. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume no resale of those assets. The lockup assumption is a very
stringent form of short sale constraint. Our intuition is that a less stringent form of short sale constraint
should be enough to keep the bubble. Kocherlakota (2008) shows that short sale constraints can arise
endogenously. Hence, the model’s results could be more general.
37This could be the searching cost for the gambling opportunity, for instance.
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Assuming that g is large enough so that g f
e
prt











Following Allen and Gale (2000), we define the fundamental value of the gambling asset
as the NPV of the returns from the gambling asset when the gamblers have to buy it








> 1, the real asset price is larger than
its fundamental value. This reflects the idea of Allen and Gale (2000) that excessive
risk-taking behavior induced by the limited liability law can create asset price bubbles.
More specifically, for bubbles to exist, entry into the real sector must be more difficult
than entry into the gambling sector, i.e., f e > f g must hold. Additionally, the NPV of
expected repayments from the gambler (Et[Σ
∞
s=t+1(Λt,sλ
s−tfs)]) must be relatively small
compared to the amount borrowed (f e). This suggests that lending to a gambler cannot
be good business for the financial intermediaries if there is a bubble in the gambling
asset price. However, even in this case, the financial intermediaries may still be willing
to lend to loan applicants because expected returns from lending to the entrepreneurs
could cover the expected losses from lending to the gamblers.
To facilitate impulse response analysis later, we define DV1t ≡ Et[Σ∞s=t+1(Λt,sλs−t)]
and DV2t ≡ Et[Σ∞s=t+1(Λt,sλs−tfs)]. These two definitions can be written in recursive
forms: DV1t = Et(Λt,t+1λ)+Et(Λt,t+1λDV1t+1), DV2t = Et(Λt,t+1λft+1)+Et(Λt,t+1λDV2t+1).






then fvt = gDV1t, bbt =
fe
fg+DV2t
, and prt = bbtfvt.
Rather than explicitly modeling the pricing behavior of the financial intermediaries,
we adopt the reduced-form specification of Chowdhury et al. (2006):
r̂bt+1 = (1 + φr)r̂
m
t ,
where a hat over a variable denotes log-deviation from its steady state, rmt is the real
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gross money market interest rate, and rbt+1 is the real gross loan rate which satisfies
(rbt+1− 1)f e = ft+1. Note that we use the beginning of the period timing for rbt+1, so the
above equation actually describes the evolution of current period credit spread. (1 + φr)
captures the interest rate pass-through.38 When φr = −1, the interest rate passthrough
is zero.
3.2.3. Labor market structure and wage setting
Following Erceg et al. (2000), we assume that there is monopolistic competition in the
labor market. Each household j ∈ (0, 1) supplies a differentiated labor type H(j) to the








, where 1 < εw 














the aggregate nominal wage rate.
There is nominal wage rigidity. More specifically, a household can reset its nominal
wage rate with a fixed probability 1− ηw in each period, where ηw ∈ (0, 1). The nominal
wage rate of those who cannot reoptimize face the wage rate from the last period, that
is, Wt(j) = Wt−1(j) if j cannot reset its wage. The real wage is defined as wt(j) ≡ Wt(j)PCt .
3.2.4. Households
In each period, the household j gets a working salary (in real terms) from the firms
wt(j)Ht(j). Following Erceg et al. (2000), we assume that the government subsidizes the
workers with a subsidy rate τl =
1
εw−1 to eliminate monopolistic distortion from the labor
market, so the actual real labor income is (1 + τl)wt(j)Ht(j). The households also get
profits from the firms. More specifically, they get profits mct from the consumption goods
producers and profits Nt[mt(ω
m
t )− ft] from the intermediate goods producers. Here, we
make use of the result of Melitz (2003) that the firm with the average productivity ωmt
earns the average profit in the market. Note that the total profit in the intermediate




goods sector net of subsidy is zero because the price is set to marginal cost when there
is a production subsidy. The total profit in the consumption goods sector net of subsidy
is (mct − τcYt). In the steady state without price adjustment it is also zero because the
price markup is driven to one by the subsidy. However, the markup can deviate from
one if there is nominal price adjustment. In that case, (mct − τcYt) will be different from
zero. Besides the labor income and profit dividends from the firms, the households also
get the repayment of their deposits from the financial intermediaries rmt St, where St is
the amount of deposits in period t.
Because of nominal wage rigidity, it is uncertain whether the household j could
reoptimize its wage. This could generate discrepancy in labor incomes between those
who can reset their wage rates and those who cannot. Hence, the decision on saving and
spending could differ across households. Following Christiano et al. (2005), we assume
that there are short-term securities with payoffs contingent on whether households can
reset their nominal wage. This ensures that the households are homogeneous in terms of
consumption, investment and deposit, though they are heterogeneous in terms of wage
setting and labor supply. Therefore, we can treat the household j as a representative
household in terms of consumption, investment, deposit and claims on profit.







t St + At(j), where At(j) is the payoff from the state-contingent securities. The
households use their wealth to consume Ct, invest N
e
t vt to build new production lines
in the intermediate goods sector, deposit St+1 to the financial intermediaries and pay a
lump-sum tax TLt (defined in real terms) to the government. Therefore, the household
budget constraint is Ct + N
e
t vt + St+1 + T
L







t St + At(j).




s−tU(Cs, Hs), where β is the subjective discount factor,
U(Cs, Hs) is the periodic utility function in period s, Cs is aggregate consumption, Hs
is labor supply. Christiano et al. (2005) suggest that it is necessary to model habit
formation to capture the hump-shaped response of consumption to the monetary policy
shock. Following them, we model habit formation as the dependence of the current





, where b is the parameter governing the relative importance of
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habit formation, χ is a positive parameter, and φl is the Frisch labor supply elasticity.




where UCt ≡ (Ct − bCt−1)−1 − βb[Et(Ct+1) − bCt]−1 is the marginal utility of consump-
tion. The FOC for deposit suggests that the marginal disutility of giving up current
consumption must be equal to the expected utility gain from the corresponding increase
in next period’s consumption.




s−tU(Cs|t, Hs|t(j)), where Xs|t denotes the value of variable X in













It determines the optimal reset wage rate and labor supply. In case there is no nominal




1/φl , which suggests that the
marginal disutility from working must be equal to the utility gain from the corresponding
increase in consumption. Note that this FOC is the same as the one in a perfectly com-
petitive labor market, as the distortion from labor market monopoly power is eliminated
by the labor subsidy.
3.2.5. Market clearing and aggregate accounting
Consumption goods market clearing requires that the output of consumption goods
equals its demand from consumption (Ct), investment (N
e
t f
e), and marketing (PACt),
where PACt ≡ pact(z)/PCt is both the average and aggregate real price setting cost since
the number of consumption goods producers is normalized to one and the consumption










(Φt − 1)2 ptyt/PCt , where we have omitted the index z by applying the
symmetry assumption across consumption goods producers. Combining this equation
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e = [1− η
2
(Φt − 1)2]p1−γt (PCt )γ−1Yt.




of aggregate intermediate goods and the number of consumption goods producers is
normalized to one, so [pt(z)
PCt
]−γYt is the total demand for the aggregate intermediate
goods. Intermediate goods market clearing then requires [pt(z)
PCt
]−γYt = Xt.
The government budget constraint requires that the tax revenue equals the sum




t . Here, we use the result
that total production subsidies (in real terms) to the consumption goods sector and in-

















t , respectively. Combining the government and household budget constraint,
we get the aggregate accounting identity Ct +N
e
t vt + St+1 = wtLt +m
c
t − τcYt −Ntft +
rmt St.
39
Gambling asset demand is equal to the number of gamblers multiplied by the per
gambler purchase, that is, (N rt − N et )
fe
P rt
. Denote the periodically fixed supply of the




GS. Finally, loan market equilibrium requires total saving equal to total lending: St+1 =
N rt f
e.
3.2.6. Monetary policy rules
Following Bilbiie et al. (2008), we define the gross real money market interest rate by
rmt ≡ imt−1/ΦCt , where imt is the gross nominal money market interest rate. The nominal
money market interest rate is set by the central bank according to a specific feedback
rule. We consider three different monetary policy rules in our analysis. The first two rules
involve interest rate smoothing. One of those two rules does not require the interest rate
to react to output while the other one does. More specifically, one rule has the following
39The aggregate payoff from the state-contingent securities is zero.
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t−1 + (1− ρ)(1.5πt+1),
while the other rule is
îmt = ρ̂i
m
t−1 + (1− ρ)(1.5πt+1 + 0.1ŷat+1),
where the real GDP level yat is defined as the sum of consumption (Ct) and invest-
ment (N et vt), and the smoothing parameter ρ is set to 0.8 so that the first interest rate
smoothing rule is identical to the one used by Bilbiie et al. (2008), while the second rule
is identical to the one used by Christiano et al. (2005). The third monetary policy rule
is a forward-looking Taylor rule without interest rate smoothing:
îmt = 1.5πt+1 + (0.5/4)ŷ
a
t+1,
where the 0.5 coefficient of Taylor’s original specification (Taylor, 1993) is divided by
4 since the annualized inflation and interest rate in Taylor’s original specification are
replaced by quarterly inflation and interest rate in the current chapter.
Note that ŷat is the deviation of real GDP from its flexible-price steady-state level.
It is equal to the theoretical output gap in case there is no technology shock, but will
diverge from the theoretical output gap if there is a technology shock to the economy.
However, as noted by Woodford (2003), the widely used empirical output gap estimated
as the deviation of output from a smooth trend can be very different from the theoretical
output gap. Neiss and Nelson (2005) estimate the theoretical output gap for the US,
UK, and Australia and find that the empirical output gap estimates from detrending
methods are very different from the theoretical output gap. Further, troughs in the HP-
filtered output gap accord well with the recessions documented by the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) (Rudd and Whelan, 2007), which suggests that by targeting
the output gap generated by detrending methods such as the HP filter, central banks
are actually targeting output fluctuations (ŷat ) rather than the theory-consistent output
gap.
40Note that îmt is the log-deviation of the gross nominal money market interest rate from its steady
state. Therefore, îmt = log(1 + i
n
t ) − log(1 + īn)
.
= int − īn, where int is the net nominal money market
interest rate and īn is its steady state level. We can replace îmt by i
n
t − īn in the policy rules. However,




Table 3.1 summarizes the main equations of the model.41 The infinite sum Vt defined
in the text is rewritten in recursive form in the table. The real profit equation of the
consumption goods sector in the table is the result of substituting the pricing equation
and demand function of the consumption goods sector into the real profit function in
the text. The model can be simplified by using the aggregate pricing equation of the
consumption goods sector PCt = pt to substitute for P
C
t in the other equations of the










t ) are not stationary in the
model. To simulate the model, we have to transform it to make all the variables in the
model stationary. This is done by defining the real price of aggregate intermediate goods
by qt = P
M
t /pt and using it to substitute for the nominal price levels in the model. The
transformed model is summarized in Table 3.2. Note that we follow Bilbiie et al. (2008)
by using beginning of the period timing, so rbt+1, ft+1, St+1 are actually determined in
period t. The model can be closed by specifying a process of the exogenous variable Zt
and the parameters: β, b, f e, f ew, γ, ε, εw, η, ηw, k, χ, φl, φr, GS, λ, fg, which we will
do in the next section.
41We do not include the specification of the monetary policy rule in the summary table to save space.
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Table 3.1: Model Summary
Consumption goods sector:













Real profit mct = {1 + τc − 1/µt −
η
2 [Φt − 1]
2}p1−γt (PCt )γ−1Yt
Aggregate pricing PCt = pt





Producer price inflation Φt = pt/pt−1
Intermediate goods sector:

























































t ) = ft








Fundamental value(gamble) fvt = gDV1t
Bubble size bbt =
fe
fg+DV2t
Asset price(gamble) prt = bbtfvt









Definition of loan rate (rbt+1 − 1)fe = ft+1




























Intermediate goods market [ pt
PCt
]−γYt = Xt




Aggregate accounting Ct +N
e
t vt + St+1 = wtLt +m
c
t − τcYt −Ntft + rmt St
Notes: DV1t ≡ Et[Σ∞s=t+1(Λt,sλs−t)] = Et(Λt,t+1λ) + Et(Λt,t+1λDV1t+1).
















UCt ≡ (Ct − bCt−1)−1 − βb[Et(Ct+1)− bCt]−1 is the marginal utility of consumption.
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Table 3.2: Transformed Model Summary
Consumption goods sector:











Real profit mct = {1 + τc − 1/µt −
η
2 [Φt − 1]
2}Yt
Intermediate goods sector:
Average individual productivity ωmt = [k/(k − ε+ 1)]1/(ε−1)ω∗t
Real Profit mt(ω
m





























t ) = ft








Fundamental value(gamble) fvt = gDV1t
Bubble size bbt =
fe
fg+DV2t
Asset price(gamble) prt = bbtfvt








Definition of loan rate (rbt+1 − 1)fe = ft+1



















Consumption goods market [1− η2 (Φt − 1)
2




Intermediate goods market Yt = Xt




Aggregate accounting Ct +N
e
t vt + St+1 = wtLt +m
c
t − τcYt −Ntft + rmt St
Notes: DV1t ≡ Et[Σ∞s=t+1(Λt,sλs−t)] = Et(Λt,t+1λ) + Et(Λt,t+1λDV1t+1).
















UCt ≡ (Ct − bCt−1)−1 − βb[Et(Ct+1)− bCt]−1 is the marginal utility of consumption.
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3.3. Model solution
3.3.1. Log-linearization
We linearize the model in Table 3.2 by the method of Uhlig (1999). The result is sum-
marized in Table 3.3, where πt ≡ pt−pt−1pt−1 is the CPI inflation rate, a bar represents a
steady-state value. Due to the symmetry assumption in the consumption goods pro-
duction sector, individual producer price inflation is equal to the average producer price
inflation. Therefore, we omit the index z in the notation. We omit z in the notation of
other variables in the consumption goods production sector for the same reason. The
labor supply equation in the nonlinear model is substituted by two equations. One is the
definition of nominal wage inflation πwt . The other equation captures the wage inflation
dynamics.42
42See Gal̀ı (2008) for a derivation. The only difference is that consumption utility in our model
involves habit formation and wage markup is driven to one by the subsidy.
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Table 3.3: Log-Linear Model Summary
Consumption goods sector:
Pricing q̂t = −µ̂t
Markup πt = βEt(πt+1)− γη µ̂t
Real profit m̂ct = (γ − 1)µ̂t + Ŷt
Intermediate goods sector:





t ) = εq̂t + (1− ε)(ŵt − ω̂mt − Ẑt) + X̂t
m̂t(ω
∗
t ) = εq̂t + (1− ε)(ŵt − ω̂∗t − Ẑt) + X̂t
Aggregate pricing q̂t =
1
1−εN̂t + ŵt − ω̂
m
t − Ẑt





−βθ̄ f̄v̄ f̂t+1 + βθ̄Et(v̂t+1)
Free entry v̂t = ŵt − Ẑt
Cutoff condition m̂t(ω
∗
t ) = f̂t
Survival rate θ̂t = −kω̂∗t
Number of firms N̂t = θ̂t + θ̄N̂t−1 + (1− θ̄)N̂et−1
Financial sector:
Fundamental value(gamble) f̂vt = D̂V 1t
Bubble size (fg +DV 2)b̂bt +DV 2D̂V 2t = 0
Asset price(gamble) p̂rt = b̂bt + f̂vt
Gambling asset market clearing feN̂rt − feφ̄N̂et = fe(1− φ̄)P̂ rt
Proportion of entrepreneur φ̂t = N̂
e
t − N̂rt
Definition of loan rate r̄bfer̂bt+1 = f̄ f̂t+1




Euler equation (deposit) ÛCt = Et(ÛCt+1) + Et(r̂
m
t+1)
Labor supply πwt − πt = ŵt − ŵt−1
πwt = βEtπ
w
t+1 − λw(ŵt − 1φl L̂t + ÛCt)
Market clearing:
Consumption goods market Ȳ Ŷt = C̄Ĉt + N̄
efeN̂et
Intermediate goods market X̂t = Ŷt
Loan market Ŝt+1 = N̂
r
t
Aggregate accounting C̄Ĉt + N̄
ev̄(N̂et + v̂t) + S̄Ŝt+1 = w̄L̄(ŵt + L̂t)
+m̄c(m̂ct − Ŷt)− N̄ f̄(N̂t + f̂t) + r̄mS̄(r̂mt + Ŝt)
Notes: D̂V 1t = (1− βλ)Et(ÛCt+1 − ÛCt) + βλEt(ÛCt+1 − ÛCt + D̂V 1t+1).
D̂V 2t = (1− βλ)Et(ÛCt+1 − ÛCt + f̂t+1) + βλEt(ÛCt+1 − ÛCt + D̂V 2t+1).
ÛCt =
βbEt(Ĉt+1)−(1+βb2)Ĉt+bĈt−1
(1−βb)(1−b) is the deviation of log marginal utility of consumption from
its steady-state level.
λw ≡ (1−ηw)(1−βηw)ηw(1+εw/φl) .
3.3.2. Calibration
As in the standard business cycle model, the periods are interpreted as quarters. The
household discount factor β is set to 1/1.0025, which implies that the US steady-state
monetary policy rate is 1% per annum (Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007; Curdia and
Woodford, 2010). The habit formation parameter b is set to 0.65, the value estimated
by Christiano et al. (2005). We set the elasticities γ = ε = 3.8 to fit the U.S. plant
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and macro trade data (Ghironi and Melitz, 2005; Bilbiie et al., 2008). Following Ghironi
and Melitz (2005), we calibrate the Pareto distribution shape parameter k to match the
standard deviation of log US plant sales which is 1.67 according to Bernard et al. (2003).
We follow Bilbiie et al. (2008) by setting the Frisch elasticity to φl = 2 and the price
stickiness parameter to η = 77.43 The weight of labor disutility χ is calibrated to generate
a steady-state labor effect level of one regardless of the Frisch elasticity. Following Erceg
et al. (2000), we set elasticity of substitution across labor types εw to 4 and sticky wage
parameter ηw to 0.75. The parameter governing interest rate passthrough, φr , is set
to 0.3, the value estimated for the US by Chowdhury et al. (2006). The steady-state
lending rate is set to (1.02)1/4 times the monetary policy rate, reflecting the 2% US
steady-state annual credit spread (Curdia and Woodford, 2010). We normalize the sunk
cost in consumption goods f e to 1 since its level does not affect the coefficients of the
impulse response functions. The steady-state intermediate goods producer survival rate
is set to 0.975, the same number as the one specified in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and
Bilbiie et al. (2008). The difference is that firms’ survival rate is fixed in Ghironi and
Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2008) while it can deviate from the steady-state level in
our model. We require the calibrated steady-state variables to capture the US private
debt-to-GDP ratio (St/y
a
t ), 80% per annum or 3.2 per quarter (Curdia and Woodford,
2010). We set λ = 0.9 and f g = 0.934, so that there is no bubble in the steady state. The
periodic supply of the gambling asset GS is normalized to one since it does not affect the
impulse response function.44 Following King and Rebelo (1999) and Bilbiie et al. (2008),
we assume that the aggregate productivity evolves as follows: lnZt = 0.979lnZt−1 + e,
where e is an i.i.d. random shock with variance σ2.
Given those specifications of parameters and steady-state variables, we can solve for
the sunk cost in labor f ew and other steady-state variables.45 Table 3.4 summarizes the








roughly equals the US data. The periodic repayment satisfies the definition f̄ = (r̄b −
1)f e. The price markup of the intermediate goods sector equals 1 because the distortion
43The key results are robust to different values of the Frisch elasticity ranging from 0 to 3.
44What matters for the impulse responses is the product of steady-state price and periodic supply
of the gambling asset. This product is determined by the steady-state gambling asset market clearing
condition, given the numerical values of our other parameters.
45The calibrate value of few is 0.04.
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from monopolistic competition is eliminated by the production subsidy. It is also easy
to verifies that m̄c − τcȲ is zero. As we discussed before, this result is due to the fact
that the price markup is driven to one by the production subsidy.
Table 3.4: Steady state magnitudes
r̄m r̄b θ̄ S̄ c̄ f̄ µ̄ w̄
1.0025 1.0075 0.975 25.464 5.757 0.0075 1 9.516
m̄c Ȳ v̄ ω̄m n̄ n̄e n̄r
4.043 11.32 0.396 1.393 216.984 5.564 25.464
3.4. Impulse responses
We consider the impulse responses of the variables to two types of shocks: (1) an ex-
pansionary monetary policy shock; and (2) a negative productivity shock. We focus on
the variables related to the riskiness of loan portfolios for financial intermediaries. More
specifically, we report and discuss the impulse responses of the number of entrepreneurs
entering, the number of entering gamblers, the survival rate of entrepreneurs, the bubble
size, and the gambling asset price. We also report the impulse responses of two other
variables (the average profit of intermediate goods producers and the required periodic
repayment to financial intermediaries) since they are closely related to investors’ entry
decisions. 46
3.4.1. An expansionary monetary policy shock
Figure 3.2 shows the impulse responses of the key variables (percentage deviations from
the steady-state levels) to a one percent unexpected decrease in the net nominal money
market interest rate.4748 The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after
the shock. The responses are normalized so that one denotes one percent. The dashed
46Interested readers can refer to the figures in the appendices for the impulse responses of all the other
variables in the model.
47Note that here we are talking about a one percent shock to the net interest rate rather than the
gross one. A one percent shock to the gross interest rate will reduce the quarterly net nominal interest
rate to a negative value, which is not possible in reality. To see this, notice that the steady state gross
nominal rate is 1.0025. Reducing this number by one percent gives a nominal gross rate of 0.9925.
48See figure A1 for impulse responses of all variables.
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curves with square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest
rate smoothing rule without reacting to output fluctuations. The solid curves with cross
markers correspond to the responses under the interest smoothing rule reacting to output
fluctuations. The dotted curves with round markers correspond to the responses under
the forward-looking Taylor rule.
The impulse responses are qualitatively similar under all three interest rate rules.
More specifically, after the shock, entrepreneurial entry increases in the first few quarters,
and then starts to decline and persistently stays below the steady-state level for a long
period of time. This result is in sharp contrast to the result of Bilbiie et al. (2008).
Bilbiie et al. (2008) who find that the expansionary monetary policy shock immediately
reduces firm entry if entry incurs sunk investment in effective labor. Furthermore, they
find firm entry persistently stays above the steady-state level after the first few periods.
As noted by Rotemberg (2008), the initial decline in firm entry in Bilbiie et al. (2008)
comes from the procyclical rise in the real wage, which makes entry more expensive and
future returns less attractive. Particularly, average profit in the intermediate goods sector
decreases after the shock despite the increase in demand. If the nominal wage is sticky,
the real wage is less procyclical and entry is less costly. Additionally, average profits in
the near future rise. This further encourages entry. Our result confirms Rotemberg’s
conjecture that an expansionary monetary policy shock stimulates entry on impact when
a realistic level of wage rigidity is introduced into the model. Holding the number of
producers constant, the increase in demand also increases profitability in the current
period. This makes debt repayment easier and raises the survival rate of intermediate
goods firms. Both the increase in firm survival rate and entrepreneurial entry in the
initial period increase the number of producers in the future. Intensified competition not
only reduces the sales of each individual intermediate goods producer but also reduces
the price of intermediate goods relative to consumption goods. This is because a one
percent decrease in the price of aggregate intermediate goods only leads to a less than
one percent decrease in the price of aggregate consumption goods when prices in the
consumption goods sector are sticky. As a result, future profits in real terms decrease,
leading to lower levels of entrepreneurial entry.
The number of gamblers in the pool of new loan applicants is persistently higher
than the steady-state level after the shock. This is because the unexpected decline in the
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nominal interest rate persistently reduces required periodic repayments to the financial
intermediaries.49 Lower periodic repayments lead to higher expected cash flows from the
gamble, which attracts more gamblers. The increase in the number of gamblers pushes
up the price of the gambling asset. Limited liability encourages excessive risk-taking
behavior. Therefore, the rise in the gambling asset price is more than the rise in its
fundamental value. In other words, the bubble size becomes larger than one. Recall
that the expected repayment from gamblers to the financial intermediaries is inversely
related to the bubble size. Therefore, after the expansionary monetary policy shock, the
expected loss from lending to gamblers will be persistently higher than the steady-state
level. Figure 3.2 suggests that the initial rise in the number of entrepreneurs quantita-
tively dominates the initial rise in the number of gamblers. Therefore, the proportion of
entrepreneurs in the borrower pool initially increases. However, the initial increase in the
proportion of entrepreneurs does not last long. Instead, the proportion of entrepreneurs
persistently stays below the steady-state level in the long run. A persistently higher than
steady state expected loss from lending to gamblers together with a persistently higher
than steady state proportion of gamblers in the borrower pool accumulates a significant
risk in the financial sector. Interestingly, the effect of the monetary policy shock on
the accumulation of long-run financial risk is quantitatively much more significant when
the interest rate does not react to output fluctuations. This is because under the rules
reacting to the output fluctuation, initial rise in entrepreneurial entry is reduced by the
central bank’s action to cut aggregate demand. The lower initial rise in entrepreneurial
entry reduces the future numbers of competitors in the market, making entry in the fol-
lowing periods more attractive. Taylor (2009) argues that keeping the policy interest rate
persistently lower than the level implied by the Taylor rule may be a source of financial
crisis. We find that if the economy is hit by an expansionary monetary policy shock and
the central bank does not react to output fluctuations, the nominal money market inter-
est rate will be persistently lower than the level implied by the forward-looking Taylor
rule.50 As we discussed, not reacting to output fluctuations leads to a more significant
long-run financial risk. In this sense, our findings in this section are consistent with
49Required periodic repayments increase in the initial periods. However, the effect of the persistent
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Taylor’s argument. However, we shall see in the next subsection, sticking to the Taylor
rule is not sufficient to eliminate financial crises.
3.4.2. A negative productivity shock
Figure 3.3 shows the impulse responses of the key variables (percentage deviations from
the steady-state levels) to a one standard deviation51 decrease in aggregate productivity,
Zt.
52 The first observation is that impulse responses are very similar under the two
interest rate rules reacting to output fluctuations. Second, impulse responses under the
two rules reacting to output fluctuations are very different from the ones under the the
interest rate rule not reacting to output fluctuations. More specifically, we find the
following key results.
When the interest rate rule reacts to output fluctuations, entrepreneurial entry ini-
tially increases. By contrast, entrepreneurial entry initially decreases when the interest
rate rule does not react to output fluctuations. The initial decrease in aggregate pro-
ductivity affects entrepreneurial entry through two channels. The first one is the direct
profit channel : persistently lower than steady state aggregate productivity can directly
reduce future profitability of intermediate goods production, which deters entrepreneurial
entry. The second channel is the interest rate channel : the real money market inter-
est rate decreases after the shock under all three interest rate rules. The reduction in the
real money market rate reduces future real loan rates and required periodic repayments,
making entrepreneurial entry more attractive. Additionally, lower real money market
rates increase demand. This reduces the negative effect of the productivity shock on
production and profits and further encourages entrepreneurial entry. The net effect of
the negative aggregate productivity shock on entrepreneurial entry depends on the size
of the offsetting effects. If the interest rate reacts to output fluctuations, the interest
rate channel dominates on impact and the firm value exceeds the sunk cost of invest-
ment, which means that entrepreneurial entry must increase to preserve the free entry
condition in the intermediate goods sector. By contrast, if the interest rate rule does not
react to output fluctuations, the direct profit channel dominates on impact, leading to
an immediate reduction in entrepreneurial entry.
51The standard deviation of the aggregate productivity shock is set to 0.0012, the number used in
King and Rebelo (1999).
52See figure A2 for impulse responses of all variables.
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The initial increase in entrepreneurial entry under the two interest rate rules reacting
to output fluctuations do not last long and are followed by persistently lower than steady
state numbers of entrepreneurial entry. This is because the initial rise in entrepreneurial
entry makes the number of intermediate goods producers persistently higher than the
steady-state number. Competition reduces future profitability and deters entry. By con-
trast, under the interest rate rule not reacting to output fluctuation, due to the initial
decrease in entrepreneurial entry, the number of intermediate goods producers is persis-
tently below its steady-state value. Less competition attracts entry, so entrepreneurial
entry quickly recovers and remains at higher than steady state values for a long period
of time.
The firm survival rate initially increases after the negative aggregate productivity
shock under the interest rate rules reacting to output fluctuations, whereas it initially
decreases under the interest rate rule not reacting to output fluctuations. The responses
of the firm survival rate become quantitatively very small after five years under all
interest rate rules. Similar to entrepreneurial entry, the firm survival rate is also affected
by the bad productivity shock through two channels: the direct profit channel and
the interest rate channel. Lower productivity reduces profits while the lower interest
rate increases profits by increasing demand.53 If the interest rate rule reacts to output
fluctuations, the interest rate channel initially dominates, leading to a higher firm survival
rate. Conversely, if the interest rate rule does not react to output fluctuations, the direct
profit channel dominates on impact. As a result, the firm survival rate decreases. A
higher survival rate of the firms also increases the future number of competitors and
deters entrepreneurial entry in the long run.
The number of gamblers initially increases under all three different monetary policy
rules. However, the initial rise in the number of gamblers is small and transitory if
the central bank does not react to output fluctuations. By contrast, the initial rise in
the number of gamblers is large and persistent if the central bank does react to output
fluctuations. Consequently, the bubble size is persistently higher if the central bank
reacts to output fluctuations. The intuition is as follows. Reduction in real interest rates
reduces future required repayments and increases cash flows from gambling. This attracts
53Note that required repayment is predetermined when the shock hits, so the cut in real interest rate
does not work through affecting the required repayment in the initial period.
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gamblers. Excessive risk-taking behavior by the gamblers increases the bubble size. If
the central bank tries to avoid the current recession by cutting the nominal interest rate,
it lowers the real interest rate more than when it does not care about output fluctuations.
As a result, cash flows from gambling increase more and more gamblers enter the market,
leading to a larger size of the bubble. A larger bubble size suggests a higher expected
loss from lending to gamblers. Together with a higher proportion of gamblers in the
borrower pool, it imposes a significant risk to the financial sector. The results suggest
that sticking to a Taylor rule is not sufficient to eliminate financial crises. Actually, in
case the economy is hit by a negative productivity shock, deviating from the Taylor rule
by not reacting to output fluctuations can reduce the long-run financial risk.
3.5. Sticky interest rate pass-through
In our benchmark model, the pass-through from changes in money market rate to the
loan rate is more than one. It is interesting to see what happens if we have a lower
interest rate pass-through. Particularly, many studies find that the interest rate pass-
through is sticky in Europe. In this section, we ask the question: “other things being
equal (we keep other parameter values calibrated for the US economy), what is the
impact of interest rate pass-through on the impulse responses?” More specifically, we
produce impulse responses of the variables to the shocks with φr = −0.8 which implies
an interest rate pass-through of 0.2, the value estimated by Chowdhury et al. (2006) for
France. 54
3.5.1. An expansionary monetary policy shock
Figure 3.4 displays the impulse responses of key variables after a one percent unexpected
decrease in net nominal money market rate.55 The qualitative results are similar to
the benchmark model. The number of entrepreneurs entering initially rises and then
remains at levels lower than the steady-state value for a long time. The intermediate
firm survival rate initially rises, followed by quantitatively negligible responses. The
54An interest rate pass-through of 0.2 is the lower bound found in the sample of Chowdhury et al.
(2006). Hence, the results of this section show that our key findings in the previous section are robust
to a wide range (from 0.2 to 1.3) of values of the interest rate pass-through.
55See figure A3 for impulse responses of all variables.
66
Conclusion
number of gamblers in the borrower pool increases and stays at levels higher than the
steady-state level for a long time. The proportion of entrepreneurs initially increases,
starts to decline after a short period and remains at levels lower than the steady-state
level for a long time. Bubble size and real asset price increases, and persistently stay at
levels higher than the steady-state levels.
Two notable differences from the benchmark model are: variables converge to their
steady-state levels faster than in the benchmark model; the quantitative responses are
less different under the three interest rate rules than in the benchmark model. This is
because now the differences in the effects of initial change in money market rate are
narrowed down by the sticky interest passthrough when transmitted to the intermediate
goods sector.
3.5.2. A negative productivity shock
Figure 3.5 displays the impulse responses of key variables after a one standard deviation
negative productivity shock.56 As in the benchmark model, entrepreneurial entry initially
increases, then declines to a level lower than the steady-state level, and slowly recovers
when the nominal interest rate reacts to output fluctuations. The difference is that the
initial increase in entrepreneurial entry is smaller, leading to smaller numbers of future
competitors in the intermediate goods sector. Hence, the proportion of entrepreneurs
in the borrower pool converges faster to the steady-state level than in the benchmark
model. The bubble size remains above the steady state for more than five years if the
interest rate reacts to output fluctuations. However, both size and duration of the bubble
are smaller in magnitude than in the benchmark model. Therefore, when the interest
rate passthrough is sticky, the economy hit by a negative productivity shock is less prone
to a long-run financial crash.
3.6. Conclusion
Our model demonstrates that large unexpected expansionary monetary policy shocks
could trigger financial crises in the long run. Interestingly, the central bank’s reaction to
output fluctuations can reduce the negative effect of the unexpected reduction in money
56See figure A4 for impulse responses of all variables.
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market interest rate on the long-run financial stability. As we know, the Taylor rule
includes the central bank’s reaction to output fluctuations. In this sense, sticking to
the Taylor rule can help reduce the long-run financial risk. However, a central bank’s
monetary policy aimed at smoothing output fluctuations can persistently worsen the
borrower pool faced by financial intermediaries in the long run if the economy is hit
by a negative aggregate productivity shock. That is, it will persistently increase the
proportion of gamblers in the pool of new loan applicants. Furthermore, the expected loss
from lending to each gambler is persistently higher than the steady-state level under such
a policy. If the central bank only responds to inflation, the negative effect of the aggregate
productivity shock on the borrower pool is more transitory but larger in magnitude,
which suggests that the financial intermediaries have to temporarily withstand higher
pressure. As a tradeoff, they can avoid persistent future losses if they survive the current
stress. The traditional business cycle view of financial crises57 suggests that a sharp drop
in the productivity of the real sector could generate a bank run. Hence, it is tempting
for governments to intervene to avoid financial crises. However, our analysis suggests
that policies that try to reduce the probability of a current crisis may create a future
crisis in the long run.
57See Allen and Gale (2007) for a summary.
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Proportion of entrepreneurs 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves
with square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule
without reacting to output fluctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses
under the interest smoothing rule reacting to output fluctuations. The dotted curves with round markers
correspond to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
70
Conclusion















0 5 10 15 20









0 5 10 15 20








0 5 10 15 20








0 5 10 15 20
Average profit (intermediate 
goods) 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves
with square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule
without reacting to output fluctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses
under the interest smoothing rule reacting to output fluctuations. The dotted curves with round markers
correspond to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Proportion of entrepreneurs 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves
with square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule
without reacting to output fluctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses
under the interest smoothing rule reacting to output fluctuations. The dotted curves with round markers
correspond to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Average profit (intermediate 
goods) 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves
with square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule
without reacting to output fluctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses
under the interest smoothing rule reacting to output fluctuations. The dotted curves with round markers
correspond to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Figure 3.4: Sticky Interest Rate Passthrough and Impulse Responses After An Expan-
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Proportion of entrepreneurs 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves
with square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule
without reacting to output fluctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses
under the interest smoothing rule reacting to output fluctuations. The dotted curves with round markers
correspond to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Average profit (intermediate 
goods) 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves
with square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule
without reacting to output fluctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses
under the interest smoothing rule reacting to output fluctuations. The dotted curves with round markers
correspond to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Figure 3.5: Sticky Interest Rate Passthrough and Impulse Responses After A Negative
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Proportion of entrepreneurs 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves
with square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule
without reacting to output fluctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses
under the interest smoothing rule reacting to output fluctuations. The dotted curves with round markers
correspond to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Average profit (intermediate 
goods) 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves
with square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule
without reacting to output fluctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses
under the interest smoothing rule reacting to output fluctuations. The dotted curves with round markers
correspond to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Entry of entrepreneurs 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves
with square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule
without reacting to output fluctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses
under the interest smoothing rule reacting to output fluctuations. The dotted curves with round markers
correspond to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Markup (consumption 
goods) 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves
with square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule
without reacting to output fluctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses
under the interest smoothing rule reacting to output fluctuations. The dotted curves with round markers
correspond to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves
with square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule
without reacting to output fluctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses
under the interest smoothing rule reacting to output fluctuations. The dotted curves with round markers
correspond to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Entry of entrepreneurs 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves
with square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule
without reacting to output fluctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses
under the interest smoothing rule reacting to output fluctuations. The dotted curves with round markers
correspond to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Impulse Responses After A Negative Aggregate Productivity Shock (Continued)
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Markup (consumption 
goods) 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves
with square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule
without reacting to output fluctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses
under the interest smoothing rule reacting to output fluctuations. The dotted curves with round markers
correspond to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Impulse Responses After A Negative Aggregate Productivity Shock (Continued)
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Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves
with square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule
without reacting to output fluctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses
under the interest smoothing rule reacting to output fluctuations. The dotted curves with round markers
correspond to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Figure A3: Sticky Interest Rate Passthrough and Impulse Responses After An Expan-
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Entry of entrepreneurs 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves
with square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule
without reacting to output fluctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses
under the interest smoothing rule reacting to output fluctuations. The dotted curves with round markers
correspond to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Sticky Interest Rate Passthrough and Impulse Responses After An Expansionary Mon-
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Markup (consumption 
goods) 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves
with square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule
without reacting to output fluctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses
under the interest smoothing rule reacting to output fluctuations. The dotted curves with round markers
correspond to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves
with square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule
without reacting to output fluctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses
under the interest smoothing rule reacting to output fluctuations. The dotted curves with round markers
correspond to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Entry of entrepreneurs 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves
with square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule
without reacting to output fluctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses
under the interest smoothing rule reacting to output fluctuations. The dotted curves with round markers
correspond to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Markup (consumption 
goods) 
Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves
with square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule
without reacting to output fluctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses
under the interest smoothing rule reacting to output fluctuations. The dotted curves with round markers
correspond to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Notes: The variable on the horizontal axis is the number of years after the shock. The responses are
normalized so that one denotes one percent deviation from the steady-state level. The dashed curves
with square markers correspond to the responses to the shocks under the interest rate smoothing rule
without reacting to output fluctuations. The solid curves with cross markers correspond to the responses
under the interest smoothing rule reacting to output fluctuations. The dotted curves with round markers
correspond to the responses under the forward-looking Taylor rule.
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Theoretical models (Romer, 1993; Lane, 1997; Razin and Loungani, 2005; Daniels and
VanHoose, 2006) suggest that increased trade openness59 tends to reduce a country’s
trend inflation rate by affecting the slope of a country’s Phillips curve. Are these models
good explanations for the reduction in national inflation rates of OECD countries in
the last few decades? To answer this question, we have to first answer the question of
whether trade openness has significantly affected the slope of the Phillips curve in OECD
countries.
A popular approach used in the literature (Temple, 2002; Daniels et al., 2005; Daniels
and VanHoose, 2009; Badinger, 2009) to test the trade openness-Phillips curve correlation
is a cross-country regression in which the parameters of the equation are assumed to
be homogeneous across countries. In this chapter, we argue that the validity of the
parameter homogeneity assumption is not guaranteed from a theoretical perspective and
that the econometric analysis should start without an a priori parameter homogeneity
assumption. Following such a principle, we start our econometric analysis with country-
58This chapter is coauthored with Sylvester Eijffinger.
59In this chapter, we measure trade openness by total imports and exports divided by gross domestic
product (GDP).
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specific time series analysis.
In a recent time series study, Ihrig et al. (2010) find no effect of trade openness on
the slope of the Phillips curve in advanced economies. This result is consistent with the
previous cross-country regression results. Although Daniels et al. (2005) find that trade
openness significant, their more recent study (Daniels and VanHoose, 2009) find trade
openness has no effect. However, using the same sample (the sample covers Australia,
Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States
from the year 1977 to 2007) we show that the “no effect” result of Ihrig et al. (2010) is
due to model misspecifications. More specifically, there are both redundant and omitted
explanatory variables in their empirical model. Additionally, potential structural breaks
in the inflation persistence of the sample countries are not considered. Correcting for
these misspecifications, we find that trade openness has significant effects on the slope
of the Phillips curve in several major industrial countries.
Badinger (2009) suggests that omitting the interaction between the degree of finan-
cial openness60 and the output gap in the regression can cause an endogeneity problem.
More specifically, trade and financial openness are highly correlated. If both have sig-
nificant effects on the slope of the Phillips curve, omitting one of them will cause an
omitted variable bias. He finds both financial openness and trade openness are signifi-
cant in the sample of developing countries while these variables are not significant in the
sample of industrialized countries. By contrast, we find trade and/or financial openness
significant in several major industrial countries. The important reason is that we relax
the parameter homogeneity assumption of Badinger (2009). Actually, among the sample
countries (Canada, France, Italy, Sweden and the United States) where we find openness
significant, both the size and sign of the effects differ.
Some authors (Ihrig et al., 2010; Ball, 2006) use panel data methods to test the trade
openness-Phillips curve correlation and find that trade openness has no significant effect
on the slope of the Phillips curve in industrialized countries. The “no effect” result is
again associated with the parameter homogeneity assumption. More specifically, they
assume that the coefficients of the explanatory variables are the same across countries.
We find that this assumption is not valid. The seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR)
estimator allows both the intercepts and the slopes of the country-specific models to be
60The degree of financial openness is measured by total foreign assets and liabilities divided by GDP.
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heterogeneous across countries. Therefore, it is free of the bias from the false parameter
homogeneity assumption. We estimate the panel by SUR and find that trade openness
has significantly changed the slope of the Phillips curve in several important industri-
alized countries. IMF (2006) also uses SUR to estimate the effect of trade openness on
the slope of the Phillips curve in several industrial countries. Similar to our finding, the
IMF study shows that trade openness has played a significant role. However, it finds
that trade openness uniformly flattens the Phillips curve in the sample of countries while
we find the effects of trade openness differ in sign across countries. Although the IMF
(2006) study does allow trade openness to have heterogeneous effects across countries,
it restricts the heterogeneity by assuming that trade openness affects the slope of each
country’s Phillips curve through a common multiplicative term. This restriction is not
guaranteed to be valid from a theoretical perspective (see Section 4.2). Our results sug-
gest that the effects of trade openness can be significantly different in both sign and size.
Hence, restricting the cross-country heterogeneity when estimating the empirical model
may not be a good idea.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical foundation of
why the parameter homogeneity assumption may be problematic. Section 3 performs
country-specific time series analysis for our sample OECD countries. Section 4 extends
the analysis to a panel data setting. Section 5 concludes.
4.2. Theoretical background
Due to differences in modeling strategies and behavioral assumptions, previous theoreti-
cal models on the trade openness-Phillips curve correlation give different predictions on
the effect of trade openness on the slope of the Phillips curve. The models of Romer
(1993) and Lane (1997) predict that an increase in trade openness steepens the Phillips
curve, while the models of Razin and Loungani (2005) and Daniels and VanHoose (2006)
predict that an increase in trade openness flattens the Phillips curve. As a consequence,
previous cross-country empirical studies (Temple, 2002; Daniels et al., 2005; Daniels and
VanHoose, 2009; Badinger, 2009) use the sign and statistical significance of estimated
trade openness-Phillips curve correlation to test the empirical relevance of various theo-
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retical models. For example, Daniels et al. (2005) find that an increase in trade openness
flattens the Phillips curve in the OECD, and they take this finding as a support for the
theoretical model of Daniels and VanHoose (2006).
A common restriction imposed in the previous cross-country empirical studies is pa-
rameter homogeneity across countries. However, the validity of the parameter homo-
geneity restriction is not guaranteed from a theoretical perspective. An increase in trade
openness can flatten the Phillips curve in some countries while steepen the Phillips curve
in other countries. In a New Keynesian model with Kimball (1995) preferences, Sbordone
(2007) shows that the open economy Phillips curve takes the following form:
πt = βEt(πt+1) + λr̂mct, (4.1)
where πt is the inflation rate, β is the time discount factor, rmct is the economy-wide
average real marginal cost of production and Et is expectations operator. Throughout
this chapter, we shall use a hat over a variable to denote the deviation of this variable
from its steady-state level, so r̂mct is the deviation of real marginal cost from its steady
state level. λ is the slope of the Phillips curve which is determined by a number of
factors. More specifically,61
λ = κ[1 + θ̄(ε̄µ + s̄y)]
−1, (4.2)
where κ ∈ (0, 1) is a function of the time discount factor (β) and the degree of price
stickiness, θ̄ is the steady-state price elasticity of demand, ε̄µ is the steady-state elasticity
of the firm’s desired markup to its market share, s̄y is the steady-state elasticity of the
firm’s marginal cost to its own output.62 Intuitively, an increase in the firm’s own price
will raise its relative price due to the fact that some of the firms cannot change their
prices in the current period. A higher demand elasticity means a higher loss of the firm’s
market share due to an increase in its relative price. Similarly, if ε̄µ is higher, a decrease
in market share will reduce the firm’s desired markup to a larger extent, so the firm will
be less willing to increase its relative price. Therefore, an increase in θ̄ or ε̄µ will weaken
the firm’s incentive to increase its own price after an increase in the average marginal
cost. Moreover, if there are firm-specific inputs, the firm’s own marginal cost not only
61See Sbordone (2007) for a derivation.
62Throughout this chapter, we shall use a bar over a variable to denote its steady state.
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depends on the economy-wide average marginal cost, but also depends on its own output.
If the firm’s marginal cost is increasing in its own output, its desired price increase after
an increase in the economy-wide average marginal cost will be limited. This relationship
is because the firm will benefit from the decline in the firm-specific marginal cost after its
relative price increases and market share declines. Therefore, the firm’s price increases
less after an increase in the economy-wide average marginal cost if the elasticity of the
firm’s marginal cost to its own output in the steady state (s̄y) is higher.
Sbordone (2007) argues that an increase in the degree of trade openness can be taken
as an increase in the number of competing firms in the market. An increase in the
number of competing firms will reduce each firm’s market share, which increases the
price elasticity of demand θ̄. This result is because with Kimball (1995) preferences, the
demand curve faced by the individual firm is downward sloping so that θ̄ is a decreasing
function of the market share.63 Therefore, an increase in the degree of trade openness
increases θ̄.
Sbordone (2007) assumes that the logarithm of the price markup is a convex function
of the logarithm of the market share.64 Under this assumption, it is easy to show that
ε̄µ is decreasing in the number of competing firms. To see this, let us denote the price
markup by µ, the market share by x. εµ is defined as
∂logµ(x)
∂logx
. Its derivative with respect
to logx is ∂(∂logµ(x)/∂logx)
∂logx
, which is positive due to the convexity assumption. Therefore,
εµ is an increasing function of the logarithm of the market share. Since the logarithmic
function is an increasing function, εµ is an increasing function of the market share as well.
An increase in the number of competing firms decreases each firm’s market share, and
63See Kimball (1995).
64The motivation for this assumption is that the logarithm of the price markup cannot be a concave
function of the logarithm of the market share. Because the price elasticity of demand is a decreasing
function of the market share and the price markup is a decreasing function of the price elasticity
of demand, the price markup is an increasing function of the market share. Since the logarithmic
transformation is a monotonically increasing transformation, the logarithm of the price markup is also
an increasing function of the logarithm of the market share. This means that as the logarithm of the
market share declines, the logarithm of the price markup also declines. As the market share approaches
zero, the logarithm of the market share approaches negative infinity. Due to concavity, the decline
in the logarithm of the price markup will be faster than the decline in the logarithm of the market
share. Therefore, the logarithm of the price markup approaches negative infinity as the logarithm of
the market share approaches negative infinity. This cannot happen because the price markup is larger
than one, which means that its logarithm is always positive. Note that this reasoning only proves that
the logarithm of the price markup is a convex function of the logarithm of the market share for small
values of the market share. However, in a monopolistically competitive market with symmetric firms,
it is reasonable to believe that the market share for each firm is very small. Thus, it is convenient to
assume global convexity.
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therefore reduces εµ. This property also holds in the steady state, so ε̄µ is a decreasing
function of the number of competing firms. Hence, an increase in the degree of trade
openness decreases ε̄µ.
Sbordone (2007) shows that the sign of the derivative of s̄y with respect to the degree
of trade openness is ambiguous, depending on a number of factors (the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply, the labor share, and the fixed cost of production). Therefore, the net effect
of a change in the degree of trade openness on the slope of the Phillips curve is ambiguous,
depending on the relative changes in θ̄, ε̄µ, s̄y after a change in trade openness. The net
effects of trade openness on the slope of the Phillips curve will differ in size and/or sign
across countries if those relative changes after a change in trade openness differ across
countries, which implies that a parameter homogeneity restriction in the econometric
analysis is potentially problematic. For this reason, we start our econometric analysis
in Section 3 with individual time series analysis which does not impose the parameter
homogeneity restriction.
4.3. Country-specific time series analysis
4.3.1. The empirical model of Ihrig et al. (2010)
We start our econometric analysis with the following backward-looking Phillips curve
model of Ihrig et al. (2010) for t = 1, ..., T :
πct = φ0 + φ1π
c








t ∗Msharet + εt, (4.3)
where πct is the core consumer price index (CPI) inflation rate which is used by Ihrig
et al. (2010) as a measure of the inflation rate (πt) in the theoretical model; αt is the
trade openness measured as total imports and exports divided by GDP; ŷt is the output




t are the deviation of energy, food and import price changes from the last
period core CPI inflation rate, respectively; Msharet is import as a share of GDP; and
εt is a normal i.i.d. error term.
65 As surveyed by Gordon (2011), there is a debate on the
65Previous empirical studies (Culver and Papell, 1997; Basher and Westerlund, 2007) find that the
inflation rate is stationary, so our econometric analysis is performed under the assumption that the
inflation rate is stationary.
96
Country-specific time series analysis
empirical modeling of inflation expectations. Some economists use the backward-looking
assumption as in equation (4.3) while others use a forward-looking assumption. We
adopt the backward-looking assumption because the estimation of the forward-looking
model involves instrumental variables and the results are subject to weak instrument
problems (Kleibergen and Mavroeidis, 2009; Nason and Smith, 2008). The focus of this
chapter is on the validity of the parameter homogeneity assumption in the previous
empirical models. Hence, it is better to separate the focus issue from the instrument
quality issue. Moreover, previous studies (Ihrig et al., 2010; Ball, 2006; IMF, 2006) on
the openness-Phillips curve correlation typically adopt the backward-looking assumption.
Therefore, it is easier to compare the results if we use the same assumption. Another
debate related to the specification of equation (4.3) is on whether or not one should




t ,Msharet into the empirical model. Those variables are called the
cost push terms. Ball (2006) argues that those terms should not be included in the
Phillips curve estimation. This argument is rooted in the theoretical model of Ball and
Mankiw (1995) in which smooth relative price changes, such as smooth changes in the
price of energy, food and import goods relative to the general price level, do not affect
the general price level. The empirical validity of that model, however, is challenged by
Bryan and Cecchetti (1999). Gordon (2011) justifies the role of relative price changes
by price rigidity in sectors which are not subject to the relative price shocks. Monacelli
(2005) suggests that in an open economy with incomplete exchange rate pass-through,
additional cost push terms must be added to the Phillips curve if the output gap is used
to measure r̂mct. Batini et al. (2005) suggest that the signs of the cost push terms in the
Phillips curve can be either positive or negative, depending on the elasticity of material
inputs with respect to gross output. Due to the theoretical ambiguity, we do not impose
any sign or size restriction on the cost push terms and will apply the general-to-specific
model selection strategy to eliminate redundant variables in section 4.3.2. For now, we
just take equation (4.3) as given and try to replicate the results of Ihrig et al. (2010).
We use similar data source as Ihrig et al. (2010). However, the frequency of our
model is annual rather than quarterly because one of the important control variables,
that is, financial openness, in Section 4.3.3, is sampled at the annual frequency (see
Table 4.1 and 4.2 for more information about the data). The sample period is 1977-
2007, which covers the sample period of Ihrig et al. (2010), 1977-2005. The Ihrig et al.
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(2010) sample consists of eleven OECD countries. Our sample takes nine out of these
eleven countries.66 While Ihrig et al. (2010) include more lags of core inflation and the
cost push terms in their quarterly model, we include only the first lag of the core inflation
rate in equation (4.3) to save degrees of freedom. Serial independence tests (Table 4.3)
suggest that including the first lag of the core inflation rate is enough to eliminate serial
correlation in the model for most sample countries. As we shall see later, in more robust
model specifications, doing so is enough to eliminate serial correlation in the model for
all sample countries. We lag the independent variables by one period to avoid potential
bias from reverse causality. An additional reason to lag the cost push terms is to avoid
collinearity between them and the lagged dependent variable.
Table 4.3 presents the estimation results of the Ihrig et al. (2010) model with our an-
nual dataset. Similar to Ihrig et al. (2010), we find no significant effect of trade openness
in most sample countries. However, it is also noticeable that not only the interaction
term between trade openness and the output gap, but also many other explanatory vari-
ables are not statistically significant. In addition, specification tests suggest that the
serial independence and normality assumption on the error terms are violated in several
sample countries, which can bias the inference. If serial correlation and non-normality
are the only problems, one can easily correct for them by adding more lags of inflation
to the model and removing outliers which cause the non-normality. Ihrig et al. (2010)
actually carry out those corrections and still get no significant role of trade openness
in their model. However, there are more problems with equation (4.3) than just serial
correlation and non-normality.
4.3.2. Toward a more robust specification
In this subsection, we consider the following potential problems associated with equation
(4.3). First, as argued by Benati (2008), inflation persistence may have changed over
time due to institutional changes. We use the Andrews (1993) test to check for potential
structural breaks in the inflation persistence of the sample countries. Even if we have
prior expectations that some events may change the process of inflation, how long does
it take for the effects of the events to be fully absorbed is uncertain. The advantage of
66Ihrig et al. (2010) measure the output gap of the sample countries by the OECD output gap
estimates. When the OECD output gap estimates are missing, as is the case for Switzerland, they use
the Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filtered output gap instead. We only include countries with the OECD
output gap estimates in our sample for consistency reasons.
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the Andrews (1993) test over the standard Chow test is that it does not require us to
specify an arbitrary year for the structural break. Therefore, it avoids the bias from a
misspecified break point.67
In six out of nine countries, i.e., Australia, Canada, France, The Netherlands, Sweden,
United States, we find a significant structural break in inflation persistence (see Table
4.3). This suggests that we need to model the potential structural break in the inflation
persistence to get the right inference. Second, there may be omitted variables in equation
(4.3). We control for four potentially omitted variables in our augmented version of the
Ihrig et al. (2010) model.68 The first two variables are interaction terms between the
logarithm of GDP (log GDP), the logarithm of population (log population) and the
output gap. Log GDP and log population are proxies for the country size. We include
the interaction term between country size and the output gap into the model because
Sbordone (2007) suggests that market size, that is, the number of competing firms, can
affect the slope of the Phillips curve. As we discussed in Section 4.2, the expected sign
of a proxy for the country size effect is ambiguous. The third additional control variable
we add to the Ihrig et al. (2010) model is an interaction term between trend inflation
(proxied by the HP filtered trend of core inflation rate) and the output gap. The reason
for adding this control variable is that the state dependent pricing models (Ball et al.,
1988; Bakhshi et al., 2007) suggest that the slope of the Phillips curve changes with the
degree of price stickiness which is affected by the trend inflation rate. Last but not least,
we add the “global inflation” variable defined by Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010). These
authors find that there is a common factor in the OECD countries’ national inflation
rates and they call this common factor “global inflation”. Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010)
suggest that a simple cross-country average of 22 OECD countries.69 fits the “global
inflation” well, so we follow them and proxy global inflation by the simple cross-country
average of the 22 OECD countries considered by Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010).
67Compared to a Chow test with correctly specified structural breaks, the Andrews (1993) test is less
efficient. To test the robustness of results, we perform the Chow test with break points detected by the
Andrews (1993) test. The results are consistent with the Andrews (1993) test results.
68In previous cross-country studies, researchers also control for the effect of central bank independence
(CBI) on the slope of the Phillips curve. Although CBI has changed in our sample countries, yearly
variation is limited. We tried to control for the effect of CBI by adding an interaction term between the
output gap and the dynamic GMT index constructed by Arnone and Romelli (2012). It turns out that
this additional interaction term is not significant in the regressions.
69The 22 OECD countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland,
Spain, United Kingdom, United States, and the Netherlands.
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Our modeling strategy is as follows: we always include a constant term, lagged core
inflation rate, the output gap and the interaction term between trade openness and the
output gap in the model as our focus variables. Other variables are taken as control
variables in the model. We remove them from the model if they are detected to be
redundant by the F-test. We introduce an interaction term between a break dummy and
the lagged dependent variable into the model whenever a structure break in the inflation
persistence is identified by the Andrews (1993) test. Moveover, we eliminate outliers
from the model by adding dummy variables which take the value one in the outlier year
and zero otherwise.70
Table 4.4 summarizes the estimation results of our models. First note that equation
(4.3) clearly omits some important control variables. Particularly, global inflation is sig-
nificant in seven out of the nine sample countries. This is consistent with the finding by
Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010) that global inflation accounts for a large proportion of the
variance in the inflation rates of the OECD countries. The degree of inflation persistence
significantly declines in recent years in three of the sample countries (Australia, Canada,
and the United States).71 The estimated coefficients of our variable of interest, the inter-
action term between trade openness and the output gap, differ in sign across countries.
More importantly, they are statistically significant in two of the major industrialized
countries, that is, Canada and France. More specifically, the estimated coefficient of the
interaction term between trade openness and the output gap is negative in Canada, sug-
gesting that trade openness flattens the Phillips curve. By contrast, there is a steepening
effect of trade openness in France.72
4.3.3. Controlling for financial openness
So far, we have only considered the effect of trade openness on the slope of the Phillips
curve. Badinger (2009) suggests that financial openness can also affect the slope of
70See the table notes for the detected outlier years.
71The break points are 1991, 1987 and 1982, respectively. The break points in other countries detected
in Table 1 are no longer significant in the current model augmented by additional control variables.
72Brambor et al. (2006) argue that in an econometric model with an interaction term, say XZ,
the magnitude and statistical significance of the interaction term are not very useful to understand
the marginal effect of X on the dependent variable Y . In this chapter, the magnitude and statistical
significance of the interaction term do matter. The slope of the Phillips curve is the marginal effect of
the output gap on the inflation rate. However, the slope itself is not our focus. The focus is the effect
of openness on the slope of the Phillips curve, which is exactly the coefficient of the interaction term
between openness and the output gap.
100
Country-specific time series analysis
the Phillips curve.73 Moreover, he finds that omitting financial openness can cause an
endogeneity bias in the estimation. For this reason, we add an interaction term between
financial openness and the output gap into the model. As noted by Badinger (2009), trade
and financial openness are highly correlated. This can cause a collinearity problem in the
estimation. Following Badinger (2009), we estimate the model with the restriction that
the coefficient of trade openness*output gap is the same as financial openness*output
gap. Formal statistical tests (Table 4.5) support the restriction in seven out of the
nine sample countries. The restriction is rejected in France and Sweden. For those
two countries, we report the estimation results without the restriction (in Table 4.5).
Overall, the results in Table 4.5 suggest that trade openness has significantly affected
the slope of the Phillips curve in Canada, France, Italy, Sweden and the US. Moreover,
the effects differ in sign. There is a flattening effect of openness in Canada, Sweden and
the US74 while there is a steepening effect in France and Italy. This result questions
the validity of the parameter homogeneity assumption in a cross-country regression.
Therefore, when financial openness is included, our time series regression results provide
stronger evidence that trade openness has significantly affected the slope of the Phillips
curve in major industrialized economies. Note that for the United States, we find that
both log GDP*output gap and log Popluation*output gap are statistically significant.
The estimates for their coefficients are similar in magnitude but different in sign. It is
possible that the joint significance of those two variables captures the effect of income
per capita. For this reason, we test the restriction that the coefficients of those two
variables are the same in magnitude. It turns out that this restriction cannot be rejected
(the p value of the test is 0.69). Therefore, we re-estimate the empirical model with this
additional restriction for the United States and report the results in Table 4.5.
73Following Badinger (2009), we define the degree of financial openness as total foreign assets and
liabilities divided by GDP. The data used to construct the financial openness measure are sourced from
the updated and extended version of the External Wealth of Nations Mark II database developed by
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
74Note that although the estimated coefficient of the output gap is negative for the US, it does not
suggest that there is a negative correlation between the output gap and the core inflation rate in the
US. The overall effect of the output gap on the inflation rate is -130.45-0.89*(trade openness+financial
openness)+7.55*(log GDP-log population)+0.53*trend inflation. The average effect over the period
1977-1991 is 0.64 while the average effect over the period 1992-2007 is 0.14, which means that the
Phillips curve has become flatter in the US.
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4.3.4. Robustness to the HP-filter output gap measure
We have estimated the empirical models with the OECD estimates of the output gaps. As
a robustness check, we also estimate the models with the HP-filtered output gap. Table
4.6 reports the results from the models selected by the general-to-specific approach. The
qualitative results almost do not change. Trade openness is found to be significant in
Canada, France, Italy and the United States. More specifically, trade openness flattens
the Phillips curve in Canada and the US while it steepens the Phillips curve in France
and Italy. The openness measures are no longer significant in Sweden, however.
4.4. Panel data analysis
It is well-known that panel data analysis may be potentially efficiency-improving since
it imposes a structure, which is extra information, on the regression. However, one has
to be aware that if a false structure is imposed the estimates will be biased. Ihrig et al.
(2010) and Ball (2006) estimate the effect of trade openness on the slope of the Phillips
curve in panel data models. Their panel data models are estimated with the assumption
that the coefficients of the explanatory variables are the same across countries. This
assumption is actually not valid for the industrialized countries sample we focus on here.
To see this, consider the following panel data model:
πci,t = δ0i + δ1π
c




2Wi,t + εit, (4.4)
where i is the index for country i = 1, ..., N , t = 1, ..., T , τ1 and τ2 are vectors of param-
eters the vector Xi,t contains the cost push terms, Wi,t contains the control variables:
log population*output gap, log GDP*output gap, trend inflation*output gap and global
inflation. This model nests the panel data models of Ihrig et al. (2010) and Ball (2006)
as special cases. More specifically, Ihrig et al. (2010) estimate a model with τ2 = 0, and
Ball (2006) estimates a model with τ1 = τ2 = 0. we perform the Roy-Zellner poolability
test (Baltagi, 2005) for equation (4.4). The test statistics is 188.47, the p value is 0.00.
Therefore, the null assumption of poolability is clearly rejected. We further test the as-
sumption that the coefficients of the interaction term between openness and the output
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gap are homogeneous across countries, allowing other parameters to be heterogeneous.
Again the assumption is rejected at the 5 percent level (the test statistics is 17.89 and
the p value is 0.02). In sum, the parameter homogeneity assumption on the parameter
of interest is rejected by our panel data model, which suggests that results from previous
empirical studies with the parameter homogeneity assumption are not robust. A typical
fixed effects model controls for the heterogeneity in the intercepts, but still omits the
heterogeneity in the slopes. Therefore, it will generate biased results when trade open-
ness has heterogeneous effects across countries. Note that controlling for the potential
omitted variable bias is important for the poolability test. If we omit the vector Wi,t
from equation (4.4), the null of parameter homogeneity cannot be rejected (the p value
is 0.68). However, variables in Wi,t are jointly significant at the 1 percent level (the Wald
test statistics is 155.06 and the p value is 0.00). This result suggests the importance of
controlling for omitted variable bias. Actually, the results in Table 4.3 suggest that trade
openness is not significant in most sample countries if the variables in Wi,t are omitted.
This leads to the spurious parameter homogeneity assumption found by the Roy-Zeller
test when we set τ2 = 0.
Equation (4.4) does not make use of the model selection results in our country-specific
models. It also does not consider the effect of financial openness. To show the robustness
of our country-specific time series regression results, we pool the country-specific time
series models summarized in Table 4.5 into a panel and estimate it by SUR.75 The
SUR estimator allows both the intercepts and the slopes of the country-specific models
to be heterogeneous across countries. Therefore, it is free of the bias from the false
parameter homogeneity assumption. The SUR estimation results are summarized in
Table 4.7. The qualitative results of the country-specific time series regressions are
largely unchanged. Trade openness remains to be statistically significant in four advanced
industrial countries: Canada, France, Sweden and the United States. Moreover, the sign
of the coefficients differ in those four countries. It is negative in Canada, Sweden and the
US, suggesting a flattening effect of trade openness on the Phillips curve. It is positive
in France, suggesting a steepening effect. IMF (2006) also estimates a SUR model for a
group of advanced industrial countries. In the IMF study, a commonality in the effects
75The SUR model is estimated with the OECD output gap measures. However, the main result does
not change if one uses the HP-filtered output instead.
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of trade openness is assumed. More specifically, trade openness is assumed to affect
the slopes of different countries’ Phillips curves through a common multiplicative term.
IMF (2006) finds a common flattening effect in the advanced industrial countries. From
the theoretical perspective of Section 4.2, there is no reason to impose the commonality
restriction. Actually, if trade openness has significantly flattened the Phillips curve
in a group of sample countries while steepened the Phillips curve in the other sample
countries, reporting the average effect can be rather misleading. The average effect can
be zero even if trade openness has played a significant role in all sample countries because
the significant effects with different signs can be averaged out.
4.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, we argue that the typical assumption of parameter homogeneity used in
the empirical studies of the trade openness-Phillips curve correlation is not guaranteed to
be valid from an ex ante theoretical perspective. We test this assumption with both time
series and panel data analysis. Our results suggest that the validity of the parameter
homogeneity assumption is highly questionable. When the parameter homogeneity as-
sumption does not hold, reporting an average effect of trade openness on the slope of the
Phillips curve can be very misleading. Significant effects with different signs can be aver-
aged out while trade openness has indeed played a role in all sample countries. Relaxing
the parameter homogeneity assumption, we find that trade openness has significantly
changed the slope of the Phillips curve in several major industrial countries.76
76In our benchmark time series analysis with both trade and financial openness, a significant effect is
found in Canada, France, Italy, Sweden and the United States.
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Table 4.1: Data sources
Variable Source
Core CPI inflation OECD main economic indicators, percentage point
Output gap OECD economic outlook No. 87, percentage point
Trade openness Penn World Table, percentage point
Energy price changes OECD main economic indicators, percentage point
Food price changes OECD main economic indicators, percentage point
Non-commodity import price changes OECD economic outlook No. 87, percentage point
Imports OECD main economic indicators, USD
Nominal GDP World Development Indicators, current USD
Real GDP World Development Indicators, constant 2000 USD
Population World Development Indicators
Financial openness calculated with data from
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), percentage point
Notes: Trade data include both goods and services.
Financial openness is defined as total foreign assets and liabilities divided by GDP.
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